Challenges Facing Military Organizational Cultural Reform: A study of the 2004 Air Force Materiel Command Reorganization by Mikulcik, Joy D.
Air Force Institute of Technology 
AFIT Scholar 
Theses and Dissertations Student Graduate Works 
3-2006 
Challenges Facing Military Organizational Cultural Reform: A 
study of the 2004 Air Force Materiel Command Reorganization 
Joy D. Mikulcik 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.afit.edu/etd 
 Part of the Industrial and Organizational Psychology Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mikulcik, Joy D., "Challenges Facing Military Organizational Cultural Reform: A study of the 2004 Air Force 
Materiel Command Reorganization" (2006). Theses and Dissertations. 3417. 
https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/3417 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Graduate Works at AFIT Scholar. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AFIT Scholar. For more 
information, please contact richard.mansfield@afit.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHALLENGES FACING MILITARY ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURAL 
REFORM: A STUDY OF THE 2004 AIR FORCE MATERIEL COMMAND 
REORGANIZATION 
 
Joy D. Mikulcik, Captain, USAF 
AFIT/GRD/ENV/06M-10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 
AIR UNIVERSITY 
AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
 
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio 
 
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the United 
States Government. 
 
AFIT/GRD/ENV/06M-10 
 
 
 
CHALLENGES FACING MILITARY ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURAL REFORM: A 
STUDY OF THE 2004 AIR FORCE MATERIEL COMMAND REORGANIZATION 
 
 
THESIS 
 
 
 
Presented to the Faculty 
 
Department of Systems and Engineering Management 
 
Graduate School of Engineering and Management 
 
Air Force Institute of Technology 
 
Air University 
 
Air Education and Training Command 
 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the 
 
Degree of Master of Science in Research and Development Management 
 
 
 
 
Joy D. Mikulcik 
 
Captain, USAF 
 
 
March 2006 
 
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED. 
 
 
AFIT IGRD/ENV 106M-10
ChallengesFacingMilitaryOrganizationalCulturalReform:
A Studyofthe2004Air ForceMaterielCommandReorganization
JoyD.Mikulcik
Captain,USAF
Approved:
~.c/+ ~, 7#£c6
CarolynM. Macola,Major(Chairman)
I~Rdd6
date
15Llu1JS
date.
.."
~
date
I
p
 
AFIT/GRD/ENV/06M-10 
 
Abstract 
 
The purpose of this research was to measure the success of the Product Center 
(PC) portion of the Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) reorganization initiated in 
2004.  The purpose of this study is threefold, (1) to determine if the 2004 AFMC Product 
Center reorganization has met General Martin’s four intended objectives, (2) the 
reorganizations effects on AFMC employee job satisfaction and organizational 
commitment and (3) to gather some general opinions about the reorganization overall.  
The literature review consisted of a detailed look at the history of AFMC, areas of 
organizational culture, and gathering detailed information regarding the 2004 
reorganization itself.  This research measured the success of the PC portion of the 
reorganization to date; assistance was solicited and provided from HQ AFMC/A8M in 
development of the survey instrument for such measurement.  Upon completion of 
development, electronic dissemination of the survey instrument was utilized to send it to 
the three AFMC PCs.  Survey results were summarized and the overall conclusion 
reached that the AFMC PC reorganization initiated in 2004 has had little or not impact to 
date based on the opinions of PC employees who responded to the survey.  
Recommendations for further research avenues are also discussed. 
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CHALLENGES FACING MILITARY ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURAL 
REFORM: A STUDY OF THE 2004 AIR FORCE MATERIEL COMMAND 
REORGANIZATION 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Overview 
Change management, organizational culture and organizational theory have a 
strong impact on any type of reorganization.  In 2004, Air Force Materiel Command 
(AFMC) initiated a reorganization under the command of General Gregory S. “Speedy” 
Martin.  The reorganization consisted of three major change areas: Headquarters (HQ) 
AFMC, transfer of installation commander responsibilities, and the Product Centers (PC) 
and Air Logistics Centers (ALC).  The HQ AFMC portion and the transfer of installation 
commander responsibilities have been completed.  The PC and ALC reorganizations are 
still ongoing and are expected to be completed sometime in 2006.  This thesis research 
will focus on the PC portion of the reorganization.  For purposes of this research, military 
organizational culture narrowly focuses on AFMC. 
Background 
Since its creation on 11 July 1992, AFMC has remained essentially the same in 
structure and mission for over 10 years.  Prior to this time, reorganization occurred 
continually as the military strove to unearth the best way to manage a weapon system 
throughout its entire life cycle. 
One of the key factors in the decision to reorganize AFMC was the 2003 
realignment of Program Executive Office Responsibilities (PEO).  This realignment 
included Aeronautical Systems Center (ASC) at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; 
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Electronic Systems Center (ESC) at Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts; and Air 
Armament Center (AAC) at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida.  Previously, these three PCs 
were organized separately and connected indirectly to the acquisition chain of command.  
In 2003, the PC commanders each assumed new roles working directly for the Assistant 
Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ): the ASC Commander is the PEO 
for Aircraft, the ESC Commander is the PEO for Command and Control (C2), and the 
AAC Commander is the PEO for Weapons and Munitions.  This federally mandated 
change further solidified General Martin’s belief that AFMC needed significant change 
to meet the recent responsibilities assigned to the PEOs. 
General Martin had four stated objectives that the reorganization was to meet:  
“First, we want to strengthen support to operational commands and 
warfighters in the field.  AFMC’s number one job is to deliver war-winning 
capabilities on time and on cost.  If we can’t do this for all weapon systems 
then we are adding no value.  Second, we must continue supporting and 
maturing the PEO realignment.  This will continue the age-old debate of when 
an acquisition program shifts into the sustainment phase.  Third, there is a 
need to structure AFMC similar to the way all other Air Force major 
commands operate.  The incorporation of the standard wing/group/squadron 
structure will make it easier for people to understand AFMC.  It will also ease 
in identification of what each organization is responsible for.  Fourth, we must 
structure the command with a capability-based versus platform-based focus.  
Rather than having separate organizations for every weapon system, they will 
be grouped based on similar capabilities.  Platforms can then share the 
responsibility and knowledge base among similar systems.”  (Martin, 2004h). 
 
The reorganization of Headquarters (HQ) AFMC focused on the mission, 
resources and support functions.  There were specific areas that AFMC felt were being 
neglected: capability planning, acquisition logistics, and fielding (Martin, 2004c).  
Through the creation of some new divisions and a new directorate, AFMC hoped to 
change this lack of oversight perception. 
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After the HQ reorganization, the next significant change occurred in March 2004 
with the movement of installation commander responsibility from the PC and ALC 
commanders to the Air Base Wing (ABW) commanders.  Since the PC commanders 
would now also occupy the role of PEOs, it was considered more important they keep 
their focus on acquisition, logistics, or test and evaluation than the everyday activities of 
running an installation.  Traditional installation support duties and responsibilities, and 
some jobs, transitioned to the respective ABW but no jobs were eliminated overall. 
The standardization of PC and ALC staffs into groups, squadrons and wings was 
the next challenge.  This new structure was designed to clarify lines of authority, 
establish command responsibility (i.e., Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) 
authority), define ownership of manpower and budget resources, reduce reliance on 
matrixed support and, of course, make the PCs and ALCs look like the rest of the 
operational Air Force (AF).  It was also hoped this new structure would make AFMC 
more recognizable and easier to understand for the rest of the AF.   
Problem Statement 
The purpose of this study is threefold: 1) to determine if the 2004 AFMC Product 
Center reorganization has met General Martin’s four intended objectives, (2) the 
reorganizations effects on AFMC employee job satisfaction and organizational 
commitment and (3) to gather some general opinions about the reorganization overall. 
 
Research Objectives/Investigative Questions/Hypothesis 
The research objective of this study is to gauge the success of the 2004 AFMC 
Product Center reorganization by surveying personnel assigned to the PCs.  It was 
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hypothesized that the reorganization had been successful in all areas to date.  
Investigative questions to support this objective include the following: 
1) Has the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization succeeded in strengthening 
support to operational commands? 
 
2) Has the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization succeeded in strengthening 
support to warfighters in the field?  
 
3) Has the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization supported the PEO 
realignment? 
 
4) Has the PEO realignment matured as a result of the 2004 AFMC Product Center 
reorganization? 
 
5) Has the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization successfully restructured 
AFMC similar to the way all other Air Force major commands operate? 
 
6) Has the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization created a capability-based 
versus platform-based focus? 
 
7) As a result of the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization, are AFMC Product 
Center employees satisfied with their jobs? 
 
8) As a result of the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization, are AFMC Product 
Center employees more or less committed to their organizations? 
 
9) This study identified areas related to the reorganization that may need additional 
attention. 
 
Methodology 
The methodology employed by this study was a web-based survey administered 
to AFMC employees (military, civilian and contractor) at the three PCs: Aeronautical 
Systems Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (WPAFB), Ohio; Electronic Systems 
Center, Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts; and Air Armament Center, Eglin Air 
Force Base, Florida.  Approval was obtained through the WPAFB Civilian Personnel 
Office to include civilian union members at the three PCs in the survey pool.  This survey 
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was endorsed and distributed through HQ AFMC/XPM (Plans and Programs Directorate, 
Manpower and Organization Division).  The survey attempted to measure the perceived 
success of each of General Martin’s four objectives, job satisfaction and organizational 
commitment and general opinions of the reorganization overall.  Once the data was 
collected, it was analyzed using the predictive analysis software program Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) Version 13.0.  Analysis included reliability 
measurements on each of the objectives, the general reorganization questions, job 
satisfaction, organizational commitment, and a combination of all four objectives and the 
general reorganization questions.  Frequencies were calculated on all questions to 
determine the mean scores per question and per objective overall. 
Limitations 
The survey was administered to current employees of AFMC PCs only.  It did not 
collect information from any other members of AFMC or previous members of AFMC 
who are now assigned to other commands.  The draft survey was administered to a pilot 
group of ten respondents for review/comment, and then finalized for the identified 
respondent group. 
Preview 
Chapter II provides the literature review information utilized for this study.  
Chapter III includes development of the investigative questions, the data collection 
method chosen and proposed data analysis.  Chapter IV includes an analysis of the  
5 
respondent data collected and discussion of these results.  Chapter V contains the 
conclusions made from this study and recommendations for further research. 
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II.  Literature Review 
 
This chapter begins with an overview of change management, organizational 
culture, organizational culture reform movements, and organizational theory (job 
satisfaction and organizational commitment).  The chapter then describes more detailed 
aspects of the 2003 PEO Realignment, a historical overview chart of AFMC, and aspects 
of the 2004 AFMC Reorganization (including transfer of installation commander 
responsibility, the PCs and ALCs).  Lastly, the chapter concludes with a detailed look at 
the Product Center portion of the reorganization.   
 
Change Management 
Effective management of change entails asking some key questions (Chapman, 
2005): What do we want to achieve with this change, why, and how will we know that 
the change has been achieved?  Who is affected by this change, and how will they react 
to it?  It is the responsibility of management to manage change.  Managers should 
facilitate and enable change from an objective position.  This helps people to understand 
the reasons for change and ways to respond positively according to their own situations 
and capabilities.  Managers should interpret and communicate versus instruct and 
impose.  Someone in management is often the “change agent” who gets the process going 
(McNamara, 1999).  This is a challenging role, especially as successes as well as 
problems arise. 
If you force change on people, normally there are more problems.  
Management can be the settling influence to help people understand and 
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manage the change.  Involving and informing people creates opportunities 
for participation in the planning and implementation of change.  Creating 
a sense of ownership among those most affected can be very beneficial 
(Chapman, 2005).   
 
Normally, senior managers and directors do not fear change; they may even thrive 
on it.  It is the people below them they need to be concerned about.  Change is often seen 
as threatening and fearsome.  When change is forced, people often feel they must be 
doing something “wrong” that caused the need for change (Chapman, 2005).  If people 
are not approaching their jobs effectively, the organization is to blame not the people 
themselves.  Strong resistance to change is often rooted in deeply conditioned or 
historically reinforced feelings.  A lot of patience is required in these situations to help 
people begin to see things differently.  Recognizing that different personality types react 
differently is also important.  Traits like reliability and dependability are opposite 
characteristics to mobility and adaptability. 
Traditionally, e-mail and written documentation are weak tools to convey and 
develop understanding for the change occurring (Chapman, 2005).  Face-to-face contact 
is always the best approach.  Surveys are a good way to repair any damage or lack of 
trust as a result of change, but only if (1) they are anonymous and (2) management 
publishes and acts on the survey results. 
There are several traditional change management principles.  The first is 
to at all times involve and seek support from people within the 
organization.  Secondly, understand where the organization is at the time.  
Then, understand where the organization wants to be and how it will get 
there.  Next, organizations should plan development towards reaching the 
goal identified in measurable stages.  Lastly, communicative, enabling 
involvement from the people should be pursued as early and freely as 
possible (Chapman, 2005). 
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Kotter (1995 and 2002) advocates eight steps to successful change.  In each step, 
he identifies a key principle relating to people’s response and approach to change. 
1. Increase Urgency – inspire people to move, make objectives real and relevant. 
2. Build the Guiding Team – get the right people in place with the right emotional 
commitment and the right mix of skills and levels. 
 
3. Get the Vision Right – get the team tot establish a simple vision and strategy, 
focus on emotional and creative aspects necessary to drive service and efficiency. 
 
4. Communicate for Buy-In – involve as many people as possible, communicate the 
essentials, simply, and appeal to and respond to people’s needs.  E-clutter 
communications – make technology work for you rather than against. 
 
5. Empower Action – remove obstacles, enable constructive feedback and lots of 
support from leaders – reward and recognize progress and achievements. 
 
6. Create Short-Term Wins – set aims that are easy to achieve – in bite-sized chunks, 
manageable numbers, of initiatives and finish current stages before starting new 
ones. 
 
7. Don’t Let Up – foster and encourage determination and persistence – ongoing 
change – encourage ongoing process reporting – highlight achieved and future 
milestones. 
 
8. Make Change Stick – reinforce the value of successful change via recruitment, 
promotion, new change leaders and weave change into culture. 
 
Change management is but one of many aspects of managing people and their 
environment which falls under the context of organizational culture. 
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Organizational Culture 
One of the most widely accepted definitions of organizational culture is: a pattern 
of basic assumptions, invented discovered or developed by a given group as it learns to 
cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked 
well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, is to be taught to new members as the 
correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems (Schein, 1990). 
So what effect does organizational culture have on implementing change?  
Similar attempts at change may succeed in one organization yet fail in another.  
Understanding the organizational culture is a prerequisite to implementing 
transformational change and development (Manley, 1998).  Change that happens to an 
organization is very different from change that is planned by the organization’s members 
(Cummings and Huse, 1989).  There are different ways of looking at change.  One 
example would be through leadership styles.  Some leaders take the approach of bold 
strategic moves while others change through diligent, continuous improvements.  
Another way to look at the change is based on the magnitude of the change itself.  The 
magnitude of change in an organization can vary tremendously case-by-case.  One such 
aspect of change management within an organization is when the change affects the 
organization’s entire culture and creates reform. 
 
Organizational Culture Reform Movements 
In the business sector, organizational culture reform movements have two key 
features: (1) their origins in the realization that U.S. companies had lost their 
competitiveness in the last three decades of the twentieth century and (2) their 
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commitment to increasing organizational effectiveness, competitiveness, flexibility, and 
responsiveness by changing organizational cultures (Shafritz and Ott, 2001).  Increased 
competition in global markets has forced the U.S. industry to take a new look at the way 
they do business.  Reform movements seek to increase productivity, flexibility, 
responsiveness and customer service by reshaping organizational cultures.  One example 
of a reform movement initiative that General Martin has referenced specifically is 
Business Process Reengineering (BPR). 
BPR is defined as “the fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of business 
processes to achieve dramatic improvements in critical, contemporary measures of 
performance, such as, cost, quality, service and speed” (Hammer and Champy, 1993).  
BPR gets down to the fundamental level of processes by asking things like “why are we 
here?” and “what is our process now?” before initiating any change.  Once processes are 
identified, the change is typically radical and dramatic, going to the root of the problem 
and making orders of magnitude in changes.  As BPR is applied to a process, the BPR 
team is always looking at the impact on the customer.  Although BPR has not been 
applied specifically to AFMC processes yet, General Martin had tasked organizations to 
identify low yielding tasks for reengineering (Martin, 2004d).  This organizational 
culture reform movement has an associated domino effect on the organizations 
employees, especially with their job satisfaction. 
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Organizational Theory – Job Satisfaction 
Job satisfaction and organizational commitment are two work attitudes that are 
often looked at in organizational culture (Williams, no date).  Many factors in the 
workplace can contribute to these attitudes, especially reorganization.  Theorists within 
this area of specialization include Frederick Hertzberg, Abraham Maslow, and A.B. 
Mumford. 
Job satisfaction is defined as “the extent to which people like (satisfaction) or 
dislike (dissatisfaction) their jobs“ (Spector, 1997).  There are different dimensions of 
satisfaction that can include factors such as co-workers, pay, job conditions, supervision, 
nature of the work and benefits.  Research has shown that satisfied employees tend to be 
more productive, creative and committed to their employers (Syptak, 1999).  It is even 
theorized that creating a positive workplace for employees can actually increase the job 
satisfaction of management as well (Spector, 1997).   
There are many different theories on job satisfaction.  Hertzberg’s theory includes 
two dimensions to job satisfaction:  motivation and hygiene (Gawel, 1997).  Hygiene 
issues would include environment related factors like company policies, supervision, 
salary, interpersonal relationships and working conditions.  Motivators can create 
satisfaction by fulfilling individual needs for meaning and personal growth.  These are 
issues like achievement, recognition, the work itself, responsibility and advancement.  
Hertzberg states that once the hygiene areas are addressed the motivators will promote 
job satisfaction and encourage production (Chapman, 2005). 
Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs has been adopted as an explanation for motivation 
in the workplace (Gawel, 1997).  This theory concludes that as needs are met on each 
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level; the person is then motivated by the need at the next level.  As needs are satisfied at 
each level, employees subsequently will want more from their employers.  The five levels 
are:  (1) physiological needs such as hunger and thirst, (2) security needs such as shelter 
and protection, (3) social needs such as the need for satisfactory and supportive 
relationships, (4) higher order needs like self-esteem, the need for recognition and belief 
in oneself and (5) self-actualization which is defined as realizing one’s full potential 
(Gawel, 1997).  Although many people never reach the top level, it is essentially an end 
goal point for which we may not even realize we are striving. 
Mumford assumed employees do not just see their job as a means to an end but 
have needs, which relate to the nature of their work.  He stated that workers have (1) 
knowledge needs for work that utilizes their knowledge and skills; (2) psychological 
needs such as recognition, responsibility, status and advancement; (3) task needs, which 
include the need for meaningful work and some degree of autonomy; and (4) moral needs 
to be treated in the way that employers would themselves wish to be treated (“Motivation 
and Job Satisfaction”, no date). 
Employee’s satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with their job parlays into another 
subfield of organizational commitment. 
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Organizational Theory - Organizational Commitment 
Organizational commitment is defined as “a psychological state that (a) 
characterizes the employee’s relationships with the organization and (b) has implications 
for the decision to continue membership in the organization” (Meyer and Allen, 1994).  
There are three focus areas for organizational commitment: affective, continuous and 
normative (Meyer and Allen, 1994).  Affective refers to the employee’s perceptions of 
their emotional attachment or identification with their organization.  Continuance refers 
to perceptions of the costs associated with leaving the organization.  Normative refers to 
an employee’s perception of obligation to their organization.   
It is also important to look at what builds an employee’s organizational 
commitment.  There are four main areas that work together: competency, comfort, 
leadership and communication (NEHRA, 2002).  Competency relates to understanding 
their role in the organization, seeing how they add value, being challenged by their work 
and having clarity about their goals.  Comfort relates to feeling part of a community, 
believing their organization is viable, experiencing a sense of team, feeling they are 
treated equally and fairly and engaging in dialogue with management.  Leadership should 
understand the employee’s vision for leadership and personal growth, create a sense of 
stability, be empathetic and stay in tune with issues.  Communication with employees 
ensures they receive valuable information frequently, helps employees see managers as 
trustworthy and candid and should allow employees regular face-to-face meetings with 
management. 
Organizational commitment in a military organization is not consistent with 
civilian organizations in some areas.  There are distinct differences between fulfilling a 
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wartime mission and completing a typical task in the business world.  The military has a 
congressionally controlled budget and other guiding documentation such as the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation that must be followed at all times.  The chain-of-command and 
military customs and courtesies are rooted in military tradition.  This is not the same 
environment you would experience in a civilian organizational hierarchy. 
Using this literature review as a foundation, the research now narrows down to 
these areas as applied within a military setting.  Some specific military issues addressed 
for this research were 1) the PEO realignment, 2) AFMC History, 3) the 2004 AFMC 
Reorganization and 4) the PC reorganization portion. 
 
Program Executive Officer Realignment 
PEO responsibility encompasses a variety of functions.  The PEO for a particular 
system, or family of systems, may handle procurement, development, implementation, 
deployment, maintenance, and even operations.  Their overarching mission is program 
oversight of their assigned system(s).  A PEO in the civilian community is often referred 
to as the executive officer.  In civilian companies, this person occupies a similar role for 
whatever service or product in which that particular company specializes.  PEOs are used 
in all branches of the military; but for this research, the focus was on the acquisition 
community due to its specific impact on AFMC. 
Just before General Martin’s arrival in AFMC in August 2003, the AF decided to 
realign PEO responsibilities.  The Secretary of the AF and Chief of Staff of the AF 
signed a memorandum called the “PEO Restructure” (Martin, 2005).  This memorandum 
reorganized the acquisition structure so both the management and execution of programs 
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for major weapon systems reside with the commander of one of the three PCs.  The 
individual accountable for program performance and the individual responsible for 
supplying the resources to get the job done are now the same.  The PEO would no longer 
work directly for the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (SAF/AQ) in Washington, 
D.C.; instead, each of the AFMC Product Center commanders would become the new 
PEO (Martin, 2004h).  This realignment included Aeronautical Systems Center (ASC) at 
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; Electronic Systems Center (ESC) at Hanscom 
Air Force Base, Massachusetts; and Air Armament Center (AAC) at Eglin Air Force 
Base, Florida.  Previously, these three product centers were organized separately and 
connected indirectly to the acquisition chain of command.  The Product Center (PC) 
commanders each assumed new roles working directly for SAF/AQ; the ASC 
Commander is the PEO for Aircraft; the ESC Commander is the PEO for Command and 
Control (C2); and the AAC Commander is the PEO for Weapons and Munitions (Martin, 
2004h).  As Center commanders, they also work directly for the AFMC commander.  
Each center vice commander and executive director was redesignated as a deputy, one for 
acquisition and one for support (“Agile Acquisition” 2004). 
In addition to the three PEO positions working directly for SAF/AQ, two of the 
AF’s major weapon systems have an individual PEO: the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and 
the F/A-22 Raptor.  The F-35 PEO will rotate annually between the Navy and the Air 
Force (“U.S. Air Force Agile Acquisition” 2004). 
When General Martin arrived in AFMC, he felt tension between AFMC and 
SAF/AQ over who was responsible for acquisition programs (Martin, 2004c).  
Conflicting guidance led AFMC and SAF/AQ to each believe they were responsible, 
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when in reality AFMC organizes and staffs the system program offices for acquisition 
support and the PEO directs the program offices under SAF/AQ guidance.   
General Martin stated that while attending program management reviews 
with SAF/AQ, he observed there was not one responsible person who 
answered to the Under Secretary for Acquisition-related issues and to the 
AFMC/CC for train-organize-equip issues.  As of 2003, there’s no longer 
finger pointing between PEO and center commanders because they are 
now one and the same.  It makes for improved efficiency and 
accountability.  (Martin, 2005) 
 
Now, the center commander’s primary responsibility is as a PEO.  To assist with 
their responsibilities as center commanders, PEOs have two assigned deputies.  Both 
deputies are at the General Officer/Senior Executive Service (SES) level, one is the focal 
point for acquisition and the other for support.  In the future, the plan is to transfer PEO 
ownership for weapon systems in the sustainment phase to the ALC commanders.  This 
will eliminate the old title center commanders held of Designated Acquisition 
Commander when they managed non-PEO programs (“Secretary of the” 2003).  The 
federally mandated PEO realignment further solidified General Martin’s belief that 
AFMC needed significant organizational change to meet the recent responsibilities 
assigned to a PEO.  This federally mandated realignment is one of the differences 
between the military and private sector organizations with respect to organizational 
culture reform.  It is mandated by Congress, not by profit or competitive edge.  Now, it is 
helpful to review the background of AFMC and the “what and why” General Martin 
believed AFMC “organizational change” was necessary. 
 
Historical Look at AFMC 
17 
The history and evolution of AFMC was looked at in detail to gain an 
understanding of how we arrived where we are today.  Although AFMC itself was 
created in 1992, there are many years of prior history to be considered in this command.  
The complete review is available in Appendix 1 of this research. 
In order to touch on the key occurrences, Table 1 provides an overview of this 
information.  This brief chronological timeline eludes to some of the added burdens a 
military organization must contend with to stay “on top”: congressional oversight, federal 
acquisition regulations, budget cycles, 40-60 year life cycles of weapon systems, research 
and development efforts; just to name a few.  All of these concerns and events over the 
past sixty plus years within the AF acquisition community provide the backdrop which, 
combined with the 2003 PEO realignment, perhaps influenced General Martin’s decision 
to reorganize AFMC. 
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Table 1: Overview of the Evolution of AFMC 
(Carlin; 1992, 2001) 
 
Time Period Key Aspects 
1900s- 1940s Basic functions of material support were completely separate.   
Creation of Air Materiel Command (AMC) and Air Research and 
Development Command (ARDC) 
1950s Program Management Responsibility Transfer (PMRT) 
The Anderson Committee 
Creation of the System Program Office (SPO) 
1960s AF acquired space mission 
AMC became Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) 
ARDC became Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) 
1970s PMRT still a concern 
1980s Packard Commission 
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act 
National Security Review (NSR) 11 
McDonald-Loh Study 
Merger of AFSC and AFLC was proposed 
Defense Management Report Decisions 
1990s to 
present 
AFSC and AFLC Integration Plan created 
AFMC was created (1992) 
Integrated Weapon System (ISXM) was developed and had many 
challenges and obstacles 
Depot Maintenance Review Team (DMRT) 
Homeland Defense and Combat Support Sector established in AFMC 
 
 
2004 AFMC Reorganization  
The AFMC reorganization initiated in 2004 consisted of three major change 
areas.  First was HQ AFMC, then the transfer of installation commander responsibilities 
from the center commanders to the Air Base Wings (ABW), and finally the 
standardization of the PCs and ALCs.  The previous AFMC structure had lasted for 
decades before our most recently departed AFMC commander, General Gregory S. 
Martin, recognized the need for organizational change.  The HQ AFMC portion and the 
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transfer of installation commander responsibilities have been completed.  The PC and 
ALC reorganization is still ongoing and is expected to be completed sometime in 2006. 
General Martin took over as AFMC Commander on 22 August 2003.  At this 
time, AFMC looked nothing like the rest of the Air Force structurally.  The title of “SPO” 
and “home office” was alien to the other operational commands.  SPOs were considered 
“nonunits” under Air Force Instruction 38-101, Air Force Organization. 
AFMC was the only Major Command (MAJCOM) not organized into the wing, 
group and squadron structure.  AFMC had always mirrored the business world, even 
though it is clearly a military organization.  It was believed by senior leaders in AFMC 
(and others) that most people in other MAJCOMs did not understand the composition or 
the mission of AFMC specifically for this reason.  The 2004 restructuring was designed 
to make AFMC more recognizable to the rest of Air Force by grouping like elements. 
General Martin outlined four objectives that the reorganization was supposed to 
meet.  The first objective was to strengthen support to operational commands and 
warfighters in the field.  Second, AFMC must continue supporting and maturing the PEO 
realignment.  Third, there is a need to structure AFMC similar to the way all other Air 
Force major commands operate.  Fourth, AFMC must structure the command with a 
capability-based versus platform-based focus (Martin, 2004h). 
The plan from the beginning (March 2004) was to conduct 6, 12 and 18-month 
reviews of each area to identify seams or gaps between new functional areas (Martin 
2004a).  A 6-month review was conducted within Headquarters AFMC in May 2005.  
This review consisted of an automated survey and personal interviews with certain 
directors and division chiefs.  Automated survey inputs came from the director and 
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his/her key staff only, not the subordinates within the headquarters.  No measurement of 
General Martin’s four key objectives have occurred prior to this thesis. 
 
Headquarters AFMC (2004) 
The reorganization of HQ AFMC focused on the mission, resources and support 
functions.  The headquarters mission is to “shape the workforce and infrastructure to 
develop, field, and sustain war-winning expeditionary capabilities.”   The HQ mission 
statement read too much like the AFMC mission statement (Martin, 2004c).  AFMC 
needed a distinction between the role of a MAJCOM HQ and the centers.  A directorate-
by-directorate scrub of non-MAJCOM work was accomplished to ensure HQ is only 
doing the tasks appropriate for a MAJCOM HQ (Martin, 2004e). 
The AFMC command management structure includes the AFMC Council who 
receive oversight and secretariat duties from the Plans and Programs Directorate and the 
Commander’s Action Group.  The AFMC Council approved the HQ AFMC 
reorganization in January 2004 (Martin, 2004a).  General Martin briefed AFMC’s desire 
to reorganize to the Chief of Staff of the AF (CSAF) and Secretary of the Air Force 
(SECAF) before he approved the Organizational Change Request (OCR), which was then 
submitted to Air Staff for approval (Martin, 2004b).  After Air Staff approval, in April 
2004, changes to offices that did not require union bargaining occurred first (Martin, 
2004f).  Next, union bargaining occurred and all union requirements were met before 
June 04.  Now the AFMC reorganization process could begin. 
First, a review of manpower authorizations required in each area occurred for the 
Capabilities Integration Directorate (XR), the Operations Directorate (DO), the 
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Engineering Directorate (EN), the Logistics and Sustainment Directorate (LG), the 
Transformation Directorate (TR) and Mission Support Directorate (MS) because these 
directorates were the most significantly affected by the reorganization.  There were new 
mission statements, new task lists, new responsibilities and skill set mismatches to be 
considered, resolved and explained. 
The headquarters reorganization moved Requirements (DR), Science and 
Technology (ST), Acquisition Center of Excellence (AE), Intelligence (IN) and EN’s 
modeling and simulation into the new XR.  XR is responsible for AFMC’s development 
mission and is the focal point for science and technology.  The goal is to have a single 
office responsible for integrating science and technology, intelligence, modeling and 
simulation and incorporating them into the capabilities produced by the AFMC 
acquisition process (Martin, 2005).  Technical orders and sustainment engineering was 
moved from EN to LG in order to consolidate all logistics and sustainment functions.  
Creation of a new Fielding Division in DO was accomplished to reenergize weapon 
system fielding.  TR and IT were combined into the new TR to focus on leveraging 
information technology and process improvement.  Day-to-day network operations 
moved from IT to MS.  Responsibility for workforce management in DP was centralized.  
The Director of Staff’s role expanded to include directing everyday activities of the 
MAJCOM headquarters staff.  These changes created new organizations to fulfill areas 
that AFMC was neglecting like capability planning, acquisition logistics and fielding 
(Martin, 2004c).  Headquarters directorates were tasked to re-engineer and map the 
processes for areas where transformation could occur. 
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Three tenets guided General Martin so the HQ will better meet customer 
expectations.  They are 1) the goal, 2) the means and 3) the attitude.  The goal represents 
the focus of delivering war-winning capabilities on time and on cost.  The means 
represent reorganizing to provide what customers need, divest of low value tasks and 
reengineer to become more efficient.  The attitude represents being professional enough 
to make the changes.  Directors were charged with transforming their organizations by 
fundamentally changing what they do to better support the AF of the future.   
Another change was implemented on 1 October 2005.  HQ AFMC has decided to 
mirror joint forces nomenclature for their organizations (Ely, 2005).  If an employee is 
working at a joint job and wants to contact someone in personnel, the office symbol is not 
DP.  It is the number one preceded by the letter J for joint.  AFMC plans to incorporate 
this same naming system.  As of Oct 05: A (for Air) then 2 is Intelligence (IN), A3 is 
Operations (DO), A4 is Logistics and Sustainment, A5 is Plans and Programs (XP), A6 is 
Communications and Information (new), A7 is Installation and Mission Support MS), A8 
is Financial Management (FM), and A9 is Capabilities Integration and Transformation 
(XR).  Even since Oct 05 designators continue to change.  For example, A5 has now 
changed to A8.  It will take some time to get used to the new nomenclature but the end 
goal of following what other services already do will be met.  The goal of this change is 
to improve communication flow and reduce spin-up times as our people transition from 
one headquarters assignment to another (Ely, 2005).  The biggest challenge will be that 
not all of AFMC’s work fits easily into the A-staff designations.  A few areas will remain 
the same. 
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This change in headquarters organizations, and subsequently nomenclature as 
well, was supported by the decision to transfer installation commander responsibility. 
 
Transfer of Installation CC Responsibility 
After the headquarters reorganization, the next significant change occurred in 
March 2004 with the movement of installation commander responsibility from the PC 
and ALC commanders to the ABW.  Since the PC commanders now also occupy the role 
of PEO, it was more important they keep their focus on acquisition, logistics, or test and 
evaluation than the everyday activities of running an installation (Martin, 2004j).  This 
change also gave “colonel level” responsibilities back to colonels.  The ABW 
commanders will now gain more of the valuable experience needed to progress to the 
senior officer level.  Traditional support duties and responsibilities, and some jobs, 
transitioned to the ABW but no jobs were eliminated overall.  The personnel change 
gives ABW commanders direct authority over the people and processes they require and 
makes AFMC look more like the rest of the AF MAJCOMs (Martin, 2004g).  (This 
change did not affect the Commander at Arnold Engineering Development Center, 
Tennessee, who will remain installation commander or the Aerospace Maintenance and 
Regeneration Center, which is a tenant on Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, 
where Air Combat Command (ACC) already fills the installation commander role.) 
The next required step to implement AFMC organizational change was the 
standardization of the PCs and ALCs, and the main purpose of this thesis research. 
 
Product Centers and Air Logistics Centers 
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Overview 
The reorganization of the PCs and ALCs, to become standardized, changed 
structures that had existed for decades, even before AFMC itself was created.  These 
changes were outlined in OCR packages with the Product Center changes occurring first.  
Planning was substantially complete in Fiscal Year (FY) 2004 but the implementation did 
not occur until FY 2005.  Some of the OCR packages (as of March 2006) are still 
outstanding and hopefully will be completed sometime later this year (2006).  At the 
center staff level, the PC/ALC reorganization took some 79 different (and often 
redundant) office symbols and created only 20 authorized office symbols.  This would 
standardize the center staff functions at each of the centers. 
 
Challenges 
There were three major challenges to overcome with this portion of the AFMC 
reorganization: standardization, decentralization of personnel and unit nomenclature 
(Ferguson, 2005).  The biggest challenge was the standardization of PC and ALC staffs 
into groups, squadrons and wings.  Directorates can now be System Sustainment Wings, 
Groups or Squadrons based on size, funding, and mission.  This new structure was 
designed to clarify lines of authority, establish command responsibility (like Uniform 
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) authority), define ownership of manpower and budget 
resources, reduce reliance on matrixed support and, of course, make the PCs and ALCs 
look like the rest of the operational AF (Ferguson, 2005).  It was hoped by the AFMC 
senior leaders that through these changes, no longer will people struggle at each AFMC 
installation to find a particular functional area. 
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AFMC has been decentralized for most of its existence.  The key unit in the 
Product Centers prior to the reorganization was the SPO.  Personnel working in the SPOs 
were assigned to functional directorates.  The directorates matrixed personnel based upon 
the needs of the individual SPOs at any given point in time.  In the instance of matrixed 
personnel the term “home office” was used to designate the organization they were 
actually assigned to.  This term was only used in AFMC. 
For example, the previous horizontal structure of the Engineering Directorate 
(EN) providing matrixed engineers wherever needed is gone.  The new vertical structure 
permanently assigns engineers to manpower-coded positions. This means when an 
engineer completed a project under the old structure, EN could move him/her wherever 
he/she was needed most.  Under the new structure, the engineer remains in the same 
position even if there isn’t a new project waiting for him/her to start.  Another 
organization may be in need of additional engineering support but cannot task that 
potentially underutilized engineer.  Adjusting to this loss of flexibility has been, and will 
likely continue to be, a challenge. 
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Drawbacks to the System Program Office Concept 
As programs progressed through the acquisition cycle from the earliest phases of 
concept development to the procurement and delivery of completed systems to the Air 
Force, the number of personnel and the mix of skills required could be expected to 
change substantially (Ferguson, 2005).  Other factors like Foreign Military Sales would 
require more personnel assigned.  Most SPOs were responsible for a single system.  
Basket SPOs were responsible for a group of systems or subsystems that had similar 
missions or purposes.  For example, at ASC the Reconnaissance SPO and the Special 
Operations Systems Forces SPO were basket SPOs.  ASC alone had over 15 unique 
SPOs.  This means no two SPOs were the same size or organized the same internally and 
crated several drawbacks to the SPO, which are highlighted next.  (Please note unit 
nomenclature will be discussed at the end of this section, as it is still an open OCR at the 
time of this research). 
The Air Force and senior leaders saw many drawbacks with the SPO concept.  
Two concerns are the lack of operational AF alignment and promotion opportunity 
(Ferguson, 2005).  The primary concern was the lack of standard group/wing/squadron 
structure like the rest of the Air Force.  Since AFMC looked different, it was harder for 
other MAJCOMs to understand.  General Martin made it a central point that AFMC 
should strive to look like the rest of the AF as much as possible.  This lack of 
standardized structure also affected AFMC’s manpower.  There was no clear standard for 
manpower required to handle the systems acquisition mission.  Proposals to incorporate 
wings or groups were first suggested in the 1990s but were rejected at higher levels 
(Carlin, 1992). 
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Another opinion raised by senior leaders was that the SPO placed its officers at a 
disadvantage for promotion.  Since most officer promotion boards consist of officers 
from operational commands, their understanding of AFMCs unique structure was often 
limited.  The duties and responsibilities of a unit commander were standardized while the 
duties of a SPO director were not.  Other personnel in the SPO were even more limited 
by their unique titles.  This may have made it less likely for promotion boards to 
recognize the performance and accomplishments of personnel assigned to AFMC SPOs 
(Ferguson, 2005). 
All of these previously discussed issues with the PCs and ALCs, as well as the 
drawbacks with the SPO concept, forced the need for a new center concept. 
 
Developing the New Center Concept 
In FY 2004, AFMC was tasked to develop a new structure that would apply to all 
the product centers (Carlin, 2001).  This also fell in line with the PEO realignment of the 
Center Commander and PEO now being the same person.  Previous jurisdictional barriers 
to establishing wings/groups/squadrons had been lifted. 
The commander of ASC, the largest of the PCs, worked with the AFMC 
Transformation Directorate to develop this new concept.  In November 2003, the then 
ASC Commander, Lieutenant General Richard Reynolds, met with the CSAF, the 
Secretary of the AF and the Assistant Secretary of the AF for Acquisition  to expand on 
the details.  For the next several months, an Integrated Product Team (IPT) led by 
AFMC/XP accomplished this tasking.  General Martin briefed this new concept at 
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CORONA SOUTH (a general officer level meeting) on 11 February 2004 and received 
endorsement by the CSAF.   
On 4 March 2004, Colonel Daniel Badger of AFMC/XPM briefed the concept to 
the AFMC Center Commanders (Carlin, 2001).  This gave the center commanders the 
opportunity to address the organizational templates as a group.  They looked at the 
Center staffs, the PCs and the ALCs.  It was decided the wings/groups/squadrons at the 
PCs would all use the word “Systems” in their new titles and the ALCs would all use the 
word “Materiel” in their new titles.  Despite the lack of resolution on a few issues, the 
new concept was incorporated into the OCR for submittal to the AF for approval by 30 
April 2004.  The issues raised included finalizing a structural template for each center, 
nomenclature for wings/groups/squadrons, the roles and responsibilities of the Center 
functional staffs and civilians leading AF units. 
The unit structures for each of the PCs were completed after a month of planning 
and data collection.  When this information was briefed to General Martin, detailed 
criteria were outlined in explanation of the structure.  The size, echelon and desired 
leadership rank would be based on the number of manpower authorizations (including 
contracted personnel), matrixed personnel, dollars managed and Acquisition Category 
(ACAT) of the programs managed (Carlin, 2001).  After Col Badger presented this 
portion, Colonel Andrew Weaver, then Special Assistant to the Commander, presented a 
briefing on study results regarding the resizing of headquarters based on ratios found in 
industry of supervisors-to-workers.  General Martin questioned several areas:  the 
nomenclature for the units, the proposals for structure of the Center-level staff 
organizations and the way in which the proposed unit structure had been developed.  He 
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did not feel they were transformational and possessed too much of the old way of looking 
at things.  He redirected the IPT to apply the concepts from Col Weaver’s briefing to the 
PC structure.  Some of the proposed groups and wings could possibly be combined into 
larger wings and also become less platform specific; the idea was to organize around 
capabilities regardless of platform. 
The AFMC Council met again on 7 April 2004 and presented a revised proposal 
to the AFMC Vice Commander.  This meeting clarified that the IPT was moving in the 
right direction to implement General Martin’s previous comments.  The proposed ASC 
structure did not change significantly but the AAC and ESC structures did.  Unit names 
were now less system specific and the number of reporting units was reduced.  (These 
new names were also meant to be more recognizable outside of AFMC.)  Although 
budget was clearly still a factor in the chosen echelon, this method was still in question.  
Gen Reynolds raised the question of what budget figures should be used:  the future year, 
the current year or total program cost?  Another concern raised was that very large wings 
may require General Officer or Senior Executive Service leadership, which would 
adversely affect the position of the Center commander and the number of promotable 
Colonel positions.  It was concluded that consistent budget numbers should be used to 
establish standards and that a peer review process should be used to finalize the 
individual center proposals. 
The AFMC Council met one last time on 15 April 2004 to present the revised 
proposal to General Martin.  The organizational structure for the three Product Centers 
was approved to go forward to a General Officer Reconciliation Board to perform the 
peer review; this would ensure consistency across the centers.  General Martin also 
30 
indicated the peer review would look closely at the criteria for determining echelon.  The 
timeline for Initial Operating Capability (IOC) for the new structure was set for 
implementation by 1 October 2004.  Also under discussion were the standardized 
templates for Center staffs and civilian led AF units. 
The General Officer Reconciliation Board was chaired by Gen Reynolds.  The 
board proposed changes to the echelon that were incorporated into the proposal.  The 
changes were briefed and approved at the AFMC Spring Commander’s Conference on 11 
May 2004.  The three PCs submitted their OCR to AFMC/XP for finalization.  The end 
result was the requested creation of ≈66 new units.  These units consisted of:  ≈11 wings, 
≈31 groups and ≈24 squadrons.  The remaining challenge with the centers is naming the 
new units. 
 
Nomenclature of the New Center Units 
The main outstanding issue under consideration now was the nomenclature of 
these new units.  There was extensive processing behind the scenes to determine if the 
units should bear names or numbers.  If they used numbers, the issue of new versus 
historical also had to be considered.  Initially, named units was the approach, with the 
idea of numbered units to be considered later in the process.  This still left the debate 
over wording of the names.  Rather than specific names like Air Interceptor Missile 
Wing, General Martin asked for broader, less-specific titles like “Air Superiority Wing” 
or “Counter Air System Wing.”  This concept was then applied to all the proposed 
names.  The idea of using historical numbered units was still on the table as well; over 
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the course of several weeks this idea was explored but not implemented.  Concerns were 
raised over using numerical designators for completely different missions than what they 
had originally been created for.  A template was created with all new numerical 
designators for the proposed units.  The numbers came from a group of unused numbers 
in the 500-series.   The theory behind this approach was that numerical designators would 
clearly distinguish which organizations fell into each chain of command while names 
only would not.  It would also shorten some of the lengthy proposed names on the table.  
This proposal was sent to General Martin for approval in early July 2004 and approved 
by him later in the month.  While AFMC continued to explore the idea of historical 
numerical designators, leaders at Air Staff expressed their disapproval of numeric 
designators completely.  In order to expedite the process, General Martin decided to go 
back to named units for the time being.  The final OCR package for the PCs requested 
named units but the ALC package still request numbered units.  The OCR package(s) that 
address the office symbols for centers are still outstanding at this time. 
 
Summary 
In the future, the new units should enable AFMC to build standard sized units and 
resources to field a weapon system or follow aircraft through depot maintenance (Martin, 
2004k).  The rest of the MAJCOMs have already been doing this for years.  There is a 
specific requirement for a fighter squadron as far as aircraft, resources and personnel.  
This has never been the case in AFMC.  As new programs develop, there is no system in 
place to get the personnel and resources needed.  Often within AFMC, we must “take” 
people from other organizations and hire contractors to fill the gaps.  With the 
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establishment of resource earning units, the basis for decisions about manpower needs 
will follow.  Numbers of personnel will vary depending on the stage in the program life 
cycle.  This will essentially reduce waste of personnel and resources in the acquisition 
community. 
The 2004 AFMC reorganization was prompted by a federally mandated change 
(PEO Realignment) which created culture reform within AFMC.  General Martin chose 
to be proactive about “fixing” known inefficiencies within AFMC (historical 
background) during his tenure as AFMC/CC by his 2004 AFMC Reorganization 
initiative.  The research now attempts to measure this success by looking General 
Martin’s four objectives the reorganization was supposed to meet: job satisfaction, 
organizational commitment, and general overall opinions through a web-based survey.  
This methodology is discussed in the next chapter. 
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III.  Methodology 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the methodology used  in this research 
effort.  Development of the investigative questions is addressed first.  Then, the rationale 
for the use of a survey as the data collection method is explained.  Lastly, the chapter 
outlines the data analysis procedures.  It was hypothesized that the reorganization was 
successful in meeting each of the four objectives and that AFMC employees are satisfied 
in their jobs and committed to their organizations. 
 
Development of the Investigative Questions 
 
The investigative questions were based on General Martin’s four objectives for 
the 2004 AFMC Reorganization effort.  The objectives were used as a basis for 
measurement of success of the reorganization.  Each objective has investigative questions 
designed specifically to measure the success of that particular objective.  Each area 
consisted of a set of survey questions that attempt to answer the investigative questions 
presented.  There are a total of eight investigative questions, listed below with their 
corresponding objective or organizational theory aspect. 
Objective 1: Strengthen support to operational commands and warfighters in the field. 
1) Has the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization succeeded in strengthening 
support to operational commands? 
 
2) Has the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization succeeded in strengthening 
support to warfighters in the field?  
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Objective 2: Continue supporting and maturing the PEO realignment. 
3) Has the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization supported the PEO 
realignment? 
 
4) Has the PEO realignment matured as a result of the 2004 AFMC Product Center 
reorganization? 
 
Objective 3: The need to structure AFMC similar to the way all other Air Force major 
commands operate. 
5) Has the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization successfully restructured 
AFMC similar to the way all other Air Force major commands operate? 
 
Objective 4:  A capability-based versus platform-based focus. 
6) Has the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization created a capability-based 
versus platform-based focus? 
 
The following investigative questions are based on the organizational theory aspects 
of this research: 
7) As a result of the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization, are AFMC Product 
Center employees satisfied with their jobs? 
 
8) As a result of the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization, are AFMC Product 
Center employees more or less committed to their organizations? 
 
Additionally, this study identified areas related to the reorganization that may 
need additional attention through open-ended questions at the end of the survey 
instrument. 
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Data Collection Method 
The data collection method chosen for this research was a web-based survey of all 
personnel currently assigned to the three AFMC PCs.  This survey was sponsored by HQ 
AFMC/A8M, who distributed the survey electronically to the three PCs.  This method of 
data collection used random sampling where every sample unit has an equal chance of 
selection.  The PC commanders were tasked to disseminate the survey to all personnel 
assigned to their respective PC; Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright-Patterson AFB, 
Ohio; Electronic Systems Center, Hanscom AFB, Massachusetts; or Air Armament 
Center, Eglin AFB, Florida.  Participation in the survey was completely voluntary and the 
anonymity of all respondents was maintained. 
The rationale for use of a survey was related to obtaining information directly 
from the people most affected by the 2004 reorganization.  Senior management played a 
huge part in the implementation but may not be aware of the impact on the other levels of 
personnel within the bureaucratic hierarchy affected.  A survey provides an anonymous 
outlet for PC personnel to voice their opinions about the reorganization without any fear 
of reprisal.  The goal was to reach personnel in all levels of the PCs through this web-
based survey.  Web-based surveys are effective tools because the survey itself can be 
completed from any location that has internet access.  Web-based surveys are also less 
costly and time consuming than surveys distributed through the mail. 
Use of a survey instrument for an AFIT thesis entails following a detailed 
approval process.  Before release to the public, the requirements included:  human 
subjects training, development of the survey instrument, thesis committee approval of the 
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survey instrument, Air Force Research Lab (AFRL) approval of the survey instrument 
and Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC) approval of the survey instrument.   
The CITI (Collaborative Institutional Review Board Training Initiative) Course in 
the Protection of Human Research Subjects Training was completed in accordance with 
this process (see Appendix X).  The survey was then designed with inputs from thesis 
committee members and additional personnel assigned to HQ AFMC/A8M.  Once 
approval was obtained from these parties, the survey was pilot tested among several 
fellow AFIT student members.  Recommendations and comments from all parties were 
taken into account when finalizing the instrument.  Once finalized, the survey was 
submitted for exemption from human experimentation requirements approval to AFRL, 
Wright Site Institutional Review Board.  This approval was obtained on November 3, 
2005 (see Appendix X).  The next step in the process required approval from AFPC, Air 
Force Survey Program.  This approval was obtained on December 14, 2005 (see 
Appendix X).  Once the approval process was complete, the survey was sent to HQ 
AFMC/A8M, for dissemination among the three PCs.  Mr. James Engle, HQ AFMC/A5 
sent the survey link and corresponding e-mail request out on December 21, 2005.  The 
survey was available for responses through January 13, 2006.  Once all responses were 
collected the data analysis process began. 
 
Data Analysis 
A survey is an effective tool for quantitative research because it focuses on 
measurable variables.  By creating groups of targeted questions for each of the four 
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objectives, their success is a measurable item for final analysis.  The choice of multiple 
item measures was made since the use of single item measures for psychological 
constructs is typically discouraged because they are presumed to have unacceptably low 
reliability (Wanous and Reichers, 1997). 
Within the survey instrument, specific sets of questions were designed to answer 
each of the investigative questions.  Survey questions 1-6 measured Objective 1.  Survey 
questions 7-16 measured Objective 2.  Survey questions 17-26 measured Objective 3.  
Survey questions 27-32 measured Objective 4.  Survey questions 33-39 gathered a 
general overview opinion of the success of the reorganization.  Survey questions 40-52 
measured job satisfaction.  Survey questions 53-58 measured organizational commitment.  
Survey questions 59-71 collected demographic information on the respondents.  Survey 
questions 72-74 provided a forum for open-ended answers regarding the reorganization.  
The responses to questions 72-74 are included in Appendices G, H and I, respectively.  
HQ AFMC/A8M verbally indicated these responses will be included as input to SAF/AQ 
as to the efficiency and effectiveness of the reorganization to date. 
Data cleaning was performed to identify any errors and/or potential conflicts with 
the data entries.  Each survey response was automatically assigned a survey identification 
number.  Questions within the survey maintained the same numbering assigned on the 
survey instrument itself (Appendix B).  Frequencies were calculated for all questions to 
determine if any answers were out of the 1 to 7 Liker scale range.  The following errors 
were identified, and corrective actions taken, using SPSS and a visual check of the data: 
? Removed the following survey responses because the respondents failed to 
answer any of the questions:  identification numbers 20, 29, 40 and 95.  This was 
visually evident in the data by the input of “999” showing up in every field. 
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? Removed the following survey because the respondents failed to answer 29 of the 
questions: identification number 146.  This was visually evident in the data by the 
occurrence of “999” 29 times. 
 
? Survey questions that were skipped within survey id numbers that were primarily 
answered in whole were given a neutral value of 4: 
o Survey identification number 9 – Question 103 
o Survey identification number 10 – Question 103 
o Survey identification number 18 – Question 112  
o Survey identification number 22 – Question 118  
o Survey identification number 28 – Questions 28, 143 
o Survey identification number 30 – Questions 73, 122 
o Survey identification number 34 – Question 30 
o Survey identification number 35 – Question 11 
o Survey identification number 36 – Question 7 
o Survey identification number 37 – Question 21 
o Survey identification number 43 – Question 134 
o Survey identification number 44 – Question 143 
o Survey identification number 45 – Question 92  
o Survey identification number 47 – Question 92  
o Survey identification number 50 – Question 79 
o Survey identification number 52 – Question 122 
o Survey identification number 55 – Question 121  
o Survey identification number 58 – Question 104 
 
For ease of analysis, it is often helpful to recode some responses into single digit 
values instead of the actual response value chosen.  Data integrity is not affected in any 
way when this is done. 
 
? Recoded the responses to question 59, age: a value of 1 represents 19 or younger, 
a value of 2 represents 20-29, a value of 3 represents 30-39, a value of 4 
represents 40-49, a value of 5 represents 50-59, a value of 6 represents 60 or older 
and a value of 9 represents a missing answer. 
 
? Recoded the responses to question 60, gender: a value of 1 represents male and a 
value of 2 represents female. 
 
? Recoded the responses to question 61, marital status: a value of 1 represents 
single, a value of 2 represents married, a value of 3 represents divorced and a 
value of 4 represents widowed. 
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? Recoded the responses to question 62, civilian or military: a value of 1 represents 
Department of Defense (DoD) civilian, a value of 2 represents retired military 
member now working as a civilian, a value of 3 represents retired military 
member now working as a contractor, a value of 4 represents active duty officer 
(not prior enlisted), a value of 5 represents active duty officer (prior enlisted), a 
value of 6 represents active duty enlisted and a value of 7 represents contractor. 
 
? Recoded the responses to questions 66-70 to consolidate the wide variety of 
responses into variables of 1 through 7.  Each of these questions had a response of 
various years and months of duty: a value of 1 represents 0-5 years, a value of 2 
represents 6-10 years, a value of 3 represents 11-15 years, a value of 4 represents 
16-20 years, a value of 5 represents 21-25 years, a value of 6 represents 26-30 
years, a value of 7 represents 31-35 years and a value of 8 represents 36 or more 
years. 
 
? Recoded the responses to question 71, current AFMC Product Center duty 
location: a value of 1 represents Wright-Patterson, a value of 2 represents 
Hanscom and a value of 3 represents Eglin.  This immediately identified the lack 
of responses from one PC, Hanscom. 
 
Questions that are negatively worded are looking for a response at the opposite 
end of the Likert scale than questions that are positively worded.  This is often a good 
indicator if the respondent is thoroughly reading each question or just marking along one 
side of the survey only.  In order to accurately assess responses to negatively worded 
questions, the answers must be reversed (1 becomes 7, 2 becomes 6, etc.) to vary in the 
same direction as the positively worded questions. 
 
? Reverse coded the following survey questions identified as falling into this 
category: 10, 28, 49, 54, 57 and 58. 
 
Once the data was cleaned, it was analyzed using the predictive analysis software 
program SPSS.  SPSS eliminates the use of manual calculations by providing both simple 
and complex types of data analysis techniques.  These can range from simple tests to 
validate reliability and general trends in data to analyzing complex relationships through 
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techniques like linear regression and then providing detailed quantitative results.  SPSS 
can also create output tables and diagrams upon request.  For this research effort, the 
analysis conducted included reliability measurements on each of the objectives, the 
general reorganization questions, job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and a 
combination of all four objectives and the general reorganization questions.  Reliability 
measures each included all of the survey questions in that section.  For example, the 
reliability of Objective 1 was calculated using survey questions 1 through 6.  The 
reliability of the combination of all the objectives and the general reorganization 
questions was calculated using questions 1 through 39.  Frequencies were calculated on 
all questions to determine the mean scores per question and per objective overall.  Mean 
scores on survey questions represent the average of all responses for that particular 
question.  The mean is a good measure of central tendency in normal distributions 
(Litwin, 1995).  Since this survey instrument had set parameters for responses (1 through 
7), the responses did not contain extreme scores.  The measurement of reliability in a 
survey instrument determines whether the instrument accurately met its intended 
objective and if the results can be duplicated. 
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Reliability and Validity 
Reliability is a statistical measure of how reproducible the survey instrument’s 
data are (Litwin, 1995).  Reliability is freedom from measurement or random error.  
When repeated measurements of the same thing give identical or very similar results, the 
measurement instrument is said to be reliable.  In survey research, there are typically two 
types of error, random error and measurement error (Litwin, 1995).  Random error is the 
unpredictable error that occurs in all research.  One way it can be reduced is by a larger 
sample size.  Measurement error refers to how well or how poorly a particular instrument 
performs in a given population (Litwin, 1995).  Statistics are used to calculate the 
probability that a particular result is due to random error.  Once the type of error is 
assessed and a measure is deemed reliable, the data results can be duplicated with a 
satisfactory degree of accuracy.  In this research effort, there was one overarching 
hypothesis (that the 2004 reorganization made a positive difference) and eight 
investigative questions.  In quantitative research, the hypothesis is either supported or not 
supported by the data.  The null hypothesis states that there is no difference among the 
groups being measured.  If the data does not support the hypothesis, then the null 
hypothesis is supported.  If the data does support the hypothesis, then the null hypothesis 
is rejected. 
Besides determining a survey item’s or scale’s reliability, the researcher must 
assess its validity, or how well it measures what it sets out to measure (Litwin, 1995).  
Just because the item in question is a good measure of reliability does not guarantee 
validity.  Content validity was determined by the thesis committee members prior to 
entering the survey approval process.  It was determined that the survey’s contents 
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included an appropriate set of items.  Content validity is not statistical in nature but 
represents the overall opinion of a group, in this case the thesis committee members.  
Criterion validity between survey instruments was not measurable because this was the 
first survey to look at the PC reorganization results.  Concurrent validity judges the 
survey instrument against some other standard for measurement that is already accepted.  
In this instance, the job satisfaction and organizational commitment sections were not 
taken from an already accepted standard for measurement.  To prove construct validity, 
replication is necessary to show that similar answers would be obtained in both 
occurrences. 
Once the analysis procedures were completed, the results were gathered for 
review in relation to the investigative questions being answered. 
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 IV. Results and Analysis 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the results of the data analysis procedures 
utilized in relation to the investigative questions being answered. 
The sample size that this survey was intended to reach was approximately 5,250 
personnel.  This total is based on the combined authorized positions at each of the three 
product centers.  (ASC at Wright-Patterson has approximately 2,450 personnel; ESC at 
Hanscom has approximately 1,950 personnel; and AAC at Eglin has approximately 850 
personnel.)  The total responses received were 164 with 5 responses being removed in the 
data cleaning process leaving 159 survey responses for analysis.  Unfortunately, survey 
responses were only received from two of the three PC locations.  (No responses were 
received from ASC at Wright-Patterson.)  Since the survey was disseminated via 
electronic mail, it is impossible to determine where the distribution stalled.  This shortfall 
prevents analysis among responses between the three different PCs. 
The dependent variable is the one being caused or affected and the independent 
variable is the one causing or affecting the other.  The reorganization represents the 
independent variable with each of the measured areas representing dependent variables.  
Whether a variable is dependent or independent varies based on the measure being used.  
If a relationship between the two variables is statistically significant, it indicates the 
variables are related to one another.  Significance is related to the importance of a 
relationship between two variables (Alreck and Settle, 2004). 
For General Martin’s four objectives, the general reorganization questions, job 
satisfaction, and organizational commitment measures, the same Likert scale of 1 through 
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7 was used.  Survey responses of 1-Strongly disagree; 2-Disagree and 3-Slightly 
Disagree were judged as indicating a negative opinion of the reorganizations impact.  
Survey responses of 5-Slightly agree; 6-Agree and 7-Strongly agree were judged as 
indicating a positive opinion of the reorganizations impact.  A survey response of 4 was 
considered “Neutral” indicating the reorganization had little or no impact. 
Each objective and general question will now be discussed individually and 
include a summary statistics table with the mean, median, and mode of all responses.  
These statistics directly support the conclusions reached.  Within the tables, “Q1” 
represents question number one on the survey instrument, “Q2” represents question 
number two on the survey instrument, etc.  The term “ObjectiveX” used in the correlation 
table represents a grouped analysis of the survey questions that answered Objective X.  
Some of the tables appear slightly compressed due to page width constraints. 
 
 
Objective 1 
Regarding Objective 1 (strengthen support to operational commands and 
warfighters in the field), the results indicate a negative opinion of the reorganization’s 
impact.  The mean scores for all six questions were within the 3.08-3.66 range, indicating 
the average response was slightly disagree or neutral (Table 2).  For both investigative 
questions 1 and 2, if the reorganization had an effect in strengthening support to 
operational commands and warfighters in the field, the hypothesis would have been 
supported.  In this case, the reorganization does not appear to have made a difference in 
these areas, so the null hypothesis is supported. 
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The internal consistency for Objective 1 is .959 based on a commonly used 
measure of reliability, Cronbach’s Alpha.  If a Cronbach’s Alpha score is higher than .70 
the measure is said to be reliable (Litwin, 1995).  Therefore, the measurement of 
Objective 1 was reliable. 
Table 2: Statistics for Objective 1 
Statistics
159 159 159 159 159 159
0 0 0 0 0 0
3.64 3.66 3.11 3.08 3.31 3.35
4.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 3.00
4 4 4 4 4 4
578 582 495 489 526 532
Valid
Missing
N
Mean
Median
Mode
Sum
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6
 
 
Objective 2 
Regarding Objective 2 (continue supporting and maturing the PEO realignment in 
the field), the results indicate the reorganization had little or no impact in this area.  The 
mean scores for all ten questions were within the 3.56-4.55 range, indicating the average 
response was neutral (Table 3).  For both investigative questions 3 and 4, if the 
reorganization had an effect continuing support for and maturing the PEO realignment, 
the hypothesis would have been supported.  In this case, the reorganization does not 
appear to have made a difference in these areas, so the null hypothesis is supported.  
The internal consistency for Objective 2 is .816; therefore, the measurement of 
Objective 2 was reliable. 
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Table 3: Statistics for Objective 2 
Statistics
159 159 159 159 159 159 159 159 159 159
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.21 4.02 3.72 4.04 4.01 4.23 4.14 4.55 4.02 3.56
4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
6 4 4 4 6 6 4 4 4 4
669 639 592 643 638 672 658 723 639 566
Valid
Missing
N
Mean
Median
Mode
Sum
Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16
 
 
Objective 3 
Regarding Objective 3 (the need to structure AFMC similar to the way all other 
Air Force major commands operate), the results indicate the reorganization had little or 
no impact in this area.  The mean scores for all ten questions were within the 3.04-4.65 
range, indicating the average response was neutral (Table 4).  On four of the survey 
questions in this section, the mode was either 5-Slightly agree or 6-Agree indicating a 
slightly more positive response for this section.  For investigative question 5, if the 
reorganization successfully restructured AFMC similar to the way all other Air Force 
major commands operate, the hypothesis would have been supported.  In this case, the 
reorganization does not appear to have made a difference in this area, so the null 
hypothesis is supported. 
The internal consistency for Objective 3 is .897; therefore, the measurement of 
Objective 3 was reliable. 
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Table 4: Statistics for Objective 3 
Statistics
159 159 159 159 159 159 159 159 159 159
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.04 4.01 3.19 4.28 3.44 4.65 3.09 3.09 3.04 3.47
4.00 4.00 3.00 5.00 4.00 5.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 4.00
5 6 4 6 4 6 4 4 4 4
642 637 508 680 547 739 491 491 484 551
Valid
Missing
N
Mean
Median
Mode
Sum
Q17 Q18 Q19 Q20 Q21 Q22 Q23 Q24 Q25 Q26
 
 
Objective 4 
Regarding Objective 4 (create a capability-based versus platform-based focus), 
the results indicate the reorganization had little or no impact in this area.  The mean 
scores for all six questions were within the 3.48-4.04 range, indicating the average 
response was neutral (Table 5).  For investigative question 6, if the reorganization had an 
effect creating a capability-based versus platform-based focus, the hypothesis would have 
been supported.  In this case, the reorganization does not appear to have made a 
difference in this area, so the null hypothesis is supported. 
The internal consistency for Objective 4 is .838; therefore, the measurement of 
Objective 4 was reliable. 
Table 5: Statistics for Objective 4 
Statistics
159 159 159 159 159 159
0 0 0 0 0 0
3.84 3.48 4.04 3.54 3.53 3.77
4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
4 4 4 4 4 4
610 553 643 563 562 600
Valid
Missing
N
Mean
Median
Mode
Sum
Q27 Q28 Q29 Q30 Q31 Q32
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General Questions 
Regarding the “General Questions” section pertaining to the reorganization as a 
whole, the results indicate the reorganization had little or no impact.  The mean scores for 
all seven questions were all in the 3.02-4.12 range, indicating the average response was 
neutral (Table 6).  This indicates the reorganization as a whole does not appear to have 
made a difference.  Increased effectiveness, efficiency and improved morale responses 
were primarily neutral.  Adaptation to reorganization changes, being well-informed about 
reorganization goals and being well-informed about actual changes that would occur 
were also primarily neutral. 
The internal consistency for the General Questions is .865; therefore, the 
measurement of the General Questions was reliable. 
Table 6: Statistics for General Questions 
Statistics
159 159 159 159 159 159 159
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3.50 3.02 3.25 3.15 4.08 4.12 4.02
4.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
4 4 4 4 5 5 5
556 480 516 501 648 655 639
Valid
Missing
N
Mean
Median
Mode
Sum
Q33 Q34 Q35 Q36 Q37 Q38 Q39
 
 
Four Objectives and General Questions Combined 
Regarding the Four Objectives and the General Questions combined, the results 
indicate the reorganization had little or no impact.  The mean scores for all the questions 
were within the 3.02-4.65 range, indicating the average response was neutral.  There was 
no investigative question targeted for this measurement. 
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The internal consistency for the Four Objectives and the General Questions 
combined is .959; therefore, this measurement was reliable. 
 
Job Satisfaction and Organizational Commitment 
The next two sections, job satisfaction and organizational commitment, did not 
specifically request responses be given in relation to the reorganization.  (This was noted 
as a shortcoming of the survey itself upon data analysis.)  Subsequently, the job 
satisfaction and organizational commitment measures are actually a snapshot in time of 
AFMC PC employee job satisfaction and organizational commitment when this survey 
was administered.  Job satisfaction and organizational commitment are not directly tied 
to the measurement of success of the reorganization and therefore cannot effectively 
answer the investigative questions, which, in turn, does not support the hypothesis. 
Regarding job satisfaction, the results indicate job satisfaction is at a satisfactory 
level.  The mean scores for twelve of the thirteen questions were within the 4.33-5.55 
range (Table 7).  The mode for the same twelve questions was 6-Strongly Agree 
indicating a generally positive response to job satisfaction related questions.  One 
question, number 49 (reverse coded), had a significantly lower mean of 2.81.  (Question 
49 was, “I often have to bend a rule or policy to get things done.”)  This may indicate a 
separate problem within the AFMC PC community.  For investigative question 7, if 
AFMC Product Center employees are satisfied with their jobs as a result of the 
reorganization, the hypothesis cannot be answered with this measurement tool. 
The internal consistency for Job Satisfaction is .851; therefore, the measurement 
of Job Satisfaction was reliable. 
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Table 7: Statistics for Job Satisfaction 
Statistics
159 159 159 159 159 159 159 159 159 159 159 159 159
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5.04 4.92 4.33 5.45 5.49 4.35 5.53 4.96 5.55 2.81 5.54 5.33 5.20
6.00 6.00 5.00 6.00 6.00 5.00 6.00 5.00 6.00 2.00 6.00 6.00 6.00
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 2 6 6 6
802 783 689 867 873 691 879 789 883 446 881 848 827
Valid
Missin
N
Mean
Median
Mode
Sum
Q40 Q41 Q42 Q43 Q44 Q45 Q46 Q47 Q48 Q49 Q50 Q51 Q52
 
 
Regarding organizational commitment, the hypothesis was intended to measure 
whether AFMC PC employees are more or less committed to their organization as a 
result of the reorganization.  The mean scores for four of the six questions were within 
the 4.25-5.20 range (Table 8).  Two questions, number 54 (reverse coded) and 57 
(reverse coded), had significantly lower means of 2.55 and 2.23 respectively.  (Question 
54 was, “If another organization offered me a promotion or pay raise I would leave.”  
Question 57 was, “I don’t feel a sense of pride or accomplishment as a result of the work 
I do.”)  This may indicate other problems within the AFMC PC community.  For 
investigative question 8, if AFMC Product Center employees are more or less committed 
to the organization, the hypothesis that they are more committed as a result of the 
reorganization cannot be answered with this measurement tool. 
The internal consistency for Organizational Commitment is .290; therefore, the 
measurement of Organizational Commitment was not reliable. 
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Table 8: Statistics for Organizational Commitment 
Statistics
159 159 159 159 159 159
0 0 0 0 0 0
5.20 2.55 4.89 5.11 2.23 4.25
6.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 2.00 4.00
6 1 6 6 2 4
827 406 778 812 354 676
Valid
Missing
N
Mean
Median
Mode
Sum
Q53 Q54 Q55 Q56 Q57 Q58
 
 
Correlations 
Correlations represent the extent to which two or more things are related to one 
another.  The correlation coefficient shows the degree to which the variables are related.  
The correlation range is from -1 to +1 with zero representing no correlation.  The Pearson 
Product Moment Correlation (Pearson r) shows the degree of linear relationship between 
two variables that have been measured on interval or ratio scales (Litwin, 1995). 
In this research, all measures of the reorganization itself are statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test).  The correlations between the four 
objectives and the general questions are all positive indicating that each of these 
measures vary together in the same direction (Table 9).  This positive correlation is 
appropriate because the stronger any respondent may have felt about the reorganization 
in one area, the stronger the same respondent would most likely be in other areas as well. 
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Table 9: Correlations 
Correlations
1 .622** .673** .570** .699**
.000 .000 .000 .000
159 159 159 159 159
.622** 1 .569** .618** .670**
.000 .000 .000 .000
159 159 159 159 159
.673** .569** 1 .628** .775**
.000 .000 .000 .000
159 159 159 159 159
.570** .618** .628** 1 .641**
.000 .000 .000 .000
159 159 159 159 159
.699** .670** .775** .641** 1
.000 .000 .000 .000
159 159 159 159 159
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
ObjectiveOne
ObjectiveTwo
ObjectiveThree
ObjectiveFour
General
ObjectiveOne ObjectiveTwo
Objective
Three ObjectiveFour General
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
 
 
Demographics 
The demographics of respondents were not a consideration in measuring the 
success of the reorganization.  This data was gathered primarily for comparisons between 
the three PCs, which is not possible because one of the PCs provided no responses to the 
web-based survey.  ESC at Hanscom provided 38.4% of the responses, AAC at Eglin 
provided 59.1% of the responses, and ASC at Wright-Patterson provided 0.0% of the 
responses (2.5% of respondents did not answer this question). 
Overall, respondents were primarily between 40-59 years of age, married, male, 
DoD civilians, and possess a graduate degree.  Rank and AFSC varied greatly and 
showed no significant trends.  Time in current position was primarily 0-5 years.  
Respondents spent a variety of years assigned in AFMC but primarily less than 0-5 years 
assigned outside of AFMC.  Overall, the most common total time working for the Air 
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Force (both military and civilian) was 16-25 years.  This data is broken down in Tables 
10 through 18. 
Table 10: Age Dispersion 
19 or younger 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60 or older 
0% 7.5% 17.6% 30.2% 33.3% 9.4% 
 
Table 11: Marital Status Dispersion 
Single Married Divorced Widowed 
11.9% 76.1% 6.9% 5% 
 
Table 12: Civilian or Military Dispersion 
DoD 
Civilian 
Retired 
Military 
now 
Civilian 
Retired 
Military 
now 
Contractor 
Active 
Officer 
(not 
prior) 
Active 
Officer 
(prior) 
Active 
Enlisted 
Contractor
50.3% 10.1% 9.4% 16.4% 5.7% 3.1% 5% 
 
Table 13: Level of Education Dispersion 
GED/High 
School 
Some 
College 
Associates 
Degree 
Bachelors 
Degree 
Graduate 
Degree 
Doctorat
e 
Other 
.6% 6.3% 2.5% 24.5% 55.3% 6.9% 3.7% 
 
Table 14: Time in Current Position Dispersion 
0-5 
Years 
6-10 
Years 
11-15 
Years 
16-20 
Years 
21-25 
Years 
26-30 
Years 
31-35 
Years 
36 or 
More 
No 
Answer
55.3% 5.7% 2.5% 6.9% 1.3% 4.4% .6% 1.2% 22.6% 
 
Table 15: Years Assigned in AFMC Dispersion 
0-5 
Years 
6-10 
Years 
11-15 
Years 
16-20 
Years 
21-25 
Years 
26-30 
Years 
31-35 
Years 
36 or 
More 
No 
Answer
25.2% 11.9% 10.1% 21.4% 13.2% 3.8% 2.5% 3.1% 11.9% 
 
Table 16: Years in Other Air Force Commands Dispersion 
0-5 
Years 
6-10 
Years 
11-15 
Years 
16-20 
Years 
21-25 
Years 
26-30 
Years 
31-35 
Years 
36 or 
More 
No 
Answer
44% 14.5% 11.9% 10.1% 1.3% 1.8% .6% 0% 15.7% 
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Table 17: Years Assigned to Secretariat or Headquarters USAF Dispersion 
0-5 
Years 
6-10 
Years 
11-15 
Years 
16-20 
Years 
21-25 
Years 
26-30 
Years 
31-35 
Years 
36 or 
More 
No 
Answer
65.4% .6% 1.3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 32.7% 
 
Table 18: Total Time Working for The Air Force (military and civilian duty) Dispersion 
0-5 
Years 
6-10 
Years 
11-15 
Years 
16-20 
Years 
21-25 
Years 
26-30 
Years 
31-35 
Years 
36 or 
More 
No 
Answer
8.2% 8.2% 8.2% 19.5% 20.1% 8.8% 10.7% 6.3% 10.1% 
 
Open-ended Questions 
The survey data also included responses to open-ended questions number 72 –74; 
however, the focus was not on analyzing this data.  The complete set of responses to 
these questions was a total of 209.  For these three questions only, all 164 survey 
respondent responses were included.  For question 72, 44% chose to answer and 56% did 
not provide any response (72 out of 164).  For question 73, 52% chose to answer and 
48% did not provide any response (85 out of 164).  For question 74, 32% chose to answer 
and 68% did not provide any response (52 out of 164).  In some answers, responses were 
edited to protect the anonymity of respondents. 
 
Summary 
Overall, measurement of the 2004 reorganization success indicated lack of a 
strong impact in any of the four objective or general areas measured.  The measurements 
of job satisfaction and organizational commitment in relation to the reorganization were 
not valid.  However, 209 comments indicate many other areas of concern within the 
AFMV PCs.  Despite the lack of any significant statistical trends, conclusions can be 
drawn from this research that will be helpful for further analysis of this area in the future.
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 V.   Discussion 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to draw conclusions regarding the 2004 AFMC PC 
Reorganization.  This research also generated recommendations for future research.  As 
with all research, limitations were also identified. 
 
Conclusions 
This research indicates that the 2004 AFMC PC Reorganization did not have a 
significant impact in the areas identified by General Martin’s four objectives or in a 
general overview of the reorganization.   
Job satisfaction and organizational commitment results were not valid based on 
the manner in which questions were presented.  In not specifically instructing 
respondents to answer these sections based on the reorganization, the data collected was 
unable to answer the hypotheses.  The job satisfaction section itself was a reliable 
measure but did not statistically measure in relation to the reorganization.  This could 
certainly be duplicated with the emphasis placed on the reorganization in future studies.  
The organizational commitment section was not a reliable measure so it most likely could 
not be duplicated in the same form. 
There could be many causes for the lack of significant impact of the 
reorganization.  The primary cause may be that since the reorganization is still ongoing 
(and less than 15 months old), the desired effects may not be evident yet.  There may also 
be the impact of General Martin’s retirement in August 2005.  Since he was the change 
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agent, he was intimately familiar with all aspects of the reorganization process and status.  
His successor has many areas to become familiar with in a short time and the 
reorganization is just one.  In contrast to the measured areas of the survey, although most 
respondents did not feel the reorganization had a significant impact, their responses to 
questions 72-74 indicate many areas of concern.  It is these areas of concern that will be 
of value in future assessments of the reorganization. 
 
Recommendations 
During the course of this research there were five areas identified for future 
research opportunities: other surveys, civilian leadership, impact of a new AFMC/CC, 
acquisition metrics and organizational culture.  They will be highlighted below. 
First, since the reorganization is still ongoing there are five opportunities in the 
future where a survey could be a valuable tool for measurement: 
• Fine-tuning this survey to be able to statistically measure ALL responses. 
• A survey of all AFMC personnel when the reorganization is officially 
complete 
• A follow-up survey for the PCs after the reorganization is complete 
• A survey of the Air Logistic Centers 
• A survey of AFMC customers (all-inclusive) 
Second, a new area of concern as a result of the reorganization is the impact of 
civilian leadership within a base level military unit.  It would be valuable to evaluate the 
effectiveness of operational civilian leadership as compared to operational military 
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leadership.  The introduction of civilian leadership in military units has raised 
considerable controversy due to various reasons such as, potential changes in promotion 
rates as a result of the reorganization. This could be measured through a study of 
promotion rates among previously assigned (old duty titles) or current (new duty titles) 
AFMC personnel. 
Third, there is the consideration that now General Martin has retired and AFMC 
is under a new commander.  It will be interesting to observe the future process of the 
reorganization since its primary change agent, General Martin, is no longer in command.  
It is also often thought that every leader wants to leave a distinct legacy and perhaps this 
reorganization was General Martin’s.  Looking into the impact of dynamic leadership 
changes made in an organization would be an excellent topic for another thesis. 
 Fourth, the development of metrics for the acquisition community would be 
another excellent way to measure success in AFMC.  This has been attempted in various 
ways throughout history and one consistent measure, AFMC wide, would prove to be 
very valuable to measure effectiveness and efficiency.  Currently, there is really no 
measure of success for acquisition programs in place.  A good startup point would be to 
matrix the open-ended comments received (Appendices G, H and I) to determine the 
“priority” perceived by the respondents. 
Lastly, the reorganization certainly had considerable organizational culture 
impacts on AFMC.  Awareness of these types of changes and their affects on AFMC 
employees would be useful.  Another assessment of job satisfaction and organizational 
commitment in relation to the reorganization could be completed individually or in 
conjunction with any of the other areas identified above.   
58 
The research, of course, had its own limitations that must be taken into 
consideration. 
 
Limitations 
There were four limitations identified in the completion of this research: the 
survey instrument, privacy act considerations, respondents were internal to AFMC and 
time constraints.   
First, the use of survey in itself creates limitations.  The respondents who chose to 
take the survey may have preconceived opinions about surveys that affected their 
responses.  Respondents may also feel it necessary to respond in a particular manner 
based on their placement in the organization.  Any number of unknown factors could 
have impacted the responses on the particular date and time a respondent chose to 
complete the survey.  The data collected also represents only one point in time and was 
only collected via the survey instrument.  Since the anonymity of respondents was 
completely preserved, this may have impacted the decision whether or not to complete 
the survey as well as the responses selected. 
Second, in order to preserve the anonymity of respondents, assigned organizations 
were not obtained.  The data could only be broken down into the PC assigned.  It might 
be useful to have specific duty assignment positions with which to identify problem areas 
in the organizations.  Currently, it is not possible to determine if there are significant 
problems in any one duty section. 
Third, the survey was also only administered to current AFMC employees.  This 
target audience could inadvertently left out valuable responses from personnel outside 
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AFMC.  Responses from customers of AFMC were also not gathered.  The 
reorganization impact on customers of AFMC may have been more significant than on 
AFMC employees.   
Lastly, the survey was only available for response for a limited time period due to 
the constraints of the AFIT thesis timeline.  It is possible a larger response could have 
been obtained if the survey was available for a longer period of time.  The dissemination 
process used was not as effective as hoped.  The first e-mail message sent out was sent to 
the PCs and the ALCs.  This caused some confusion as the survey was only intended for 
the PCs.  A follow up e-mail was sent out to clarify this point but there is no way to 
accurately assess how well the survey was disseminated.  It may have been better for it to 
be sent out in a different manner.  
In summary, great potential for future research was identified as well as building 
blocks for AFMC to further assess the success of reorganization objectives.  The survey 
instrument developed, data collected, and conclusions reached in this research effort 
serve as a valuable contribution to the planned follow-up reorganization assessments HQ 
AFMC/A8M will be administering in the near future. 
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Appendix A: Historical Look at AFMC 
 
Historical Look at AFMC 
Military leaders have been trying to figure out the best way to do things for as 
long as we can remember.  Reorganizations, realignments, restructuring, and whatever 
the “buzz” word of the time seems to occur almost continuously.  A great example of this 
attempt is the evolution of AFMC.  It is the unique and diverse missions within AFMC 
that have so challenged military leaders for years and continue to do so today. 
AFMC was established on 1 July 1992 with the combination of Air Force 
Logistics Command (AFLC) and Air Force Systems Command (AFSC).  AFLC and 
AFSC were not just merged together but integrated through their overlapping roles.  The 
overarching goal of the merger was to manage weapon systems throughout their entire 
life cycle.  One overarching command would now be responsible for “cradle-to-grave” 
management including research and development, acquisition and sustainment.  The 
establishment of AFMC was based on “certain reoccurring issues…all stemmed from the 
common problem of finding an effective way to manage a weapon system throughout its 
life cycle” (Carlin, 1992).  Unfortunately, the answer to this question changed frequently 
over the years depending on the leadership of the time.  To understand the theory behind 
the creation of AFMC, it is helpful to look at AFMC from its earliest beginnings.   
 
1900’s – 1940’s 
When the Army Signal Corps controlled military aviation in 1917, the three basic 
functions of materiel support, research and development (R&D), supply and maintenance 
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and procurement and production were completely separate (Carlin, 1992).  In the Army 
Air Corps years, R&D was mostly left to private industry and the Material Division 
unified the three remaining functions. 
For most of World War II the Materiel Command (MC) handled procurement and 
the Air Service Command (ASC) handled logistics.  Problems occurred when the MC 
and the ASC overlapped in functions.  Senior leaders recognized the need for change and 
in 1944 combined the two commands into the Air Technical Service Command, which a 
year later was renamed the Air Materiel Command (AMC).  The changing role of R&D 
throughout this process was best addressed by General Henry H. Arnold.  He believed 
that science and technology was the key to an effective Air Force in the future (Carlin, 
1992).  This led to the decision to separate R&D from procurement and the subsequent 
establishment of the Air Research and Development Command (ARDC) in 1950.   
 
1950’s 
The problem now was figuring out when each command would assume 
responsibility for a weapons system; there was no distinct dividing line between the 
commands.  Offices became known as Joint Program Offices (JPO) and the two 
commands worked in conjunction on weapon systems.  Division of funding and 
engineering and the issue of Program Management Responsibility Transfer (PMRT) were 
ongoing concerns.  PMRT was designed to occur between the two commands when a 
weapon system moved into the sustainment phase.  It was difficult to determine in the 
“cradle-to-grave” life of a weapon system, at what point would PMRT be shifted from 
one command to another.  Often when a system shifted, too much knowledge and 
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background was essentially “left behind” in the old command despite the supposed JPO 
structure.  In an effort to solve the responsibility problems between the commands, 
another organizational change occurred.  The informal JPO structure was restructured to 
the Weapon System Program Office (WSPO) and was now tightly structured under 
several AF regulations.  Still, the concern of whether R&D should be separate from 
acquisition lingered.   
In 1959, General Curtis LeMay formed a study group, headed by General Samuel 
Anderson, to address the management of weapon support systems throughout their life 
cycle.  This huge undertaking, known as the Anderson Committee, came up with several 
ideas to determine a concept of efficient weapon system management and any 
organizational changes needed to make the concept a reality.  One leader of the time, 
General Mark Bradley, Jr., proposed minor realignment of functions versus 
reorganization.  General Bradley felt this would improve the present way of doing 
business yet not make any fundamental changes.  It was General Anderson who believed 
that fundamental change was necessary to fix what was broken and truly integrate 
development, procurement and production.  General Bernard Schriever proposed one 
large acquisition command that was responsible for R&D and procurement and a separate 
command for logistic support.  It was General Schriever’s belief that engineers and 
logisticians were not meant to be in competition with one another but actually represent 
the present and future of the service.  In all, the Anderson Committee came up with four 
proposed courses of action and the Chief of Staff, General Thomas White, made the final 
selection.  In 1960, the final report outlining the decision most closely resembled General 
Bradley’s proposal.  Although General Anderson’s proposal to reunite ARDC and AMC 
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was not adopted at this time, it ended up happening some 31 years later with the creation 
of AFMC.   
This led to the creation of a new series of AFRs starting with 375-1 that governed 
weapon system management.  More importantly, it created the organization that remained 
in place in AFMC for over 40 years, the System Program Office (SPO).  With the demise 
of the WSPO the SPO was lauded to be able to, “carry on concurrently a wide range of 
diverse yet highly integrated acquisition activities” (Carlin, 1992).   This was the 
overarching goal of everyone involved. 
 
1960’s 
Another major change occurred in the Air Force in 1961 when the Secretary of 
Defense, Robert McNamara, assigned the space mission to the Air Force.  With the 
incorporation of this new mission, AMC and ARDC were renamed AFSC and AFLC.  
AFSC would handle R&D, procurement and production while AFLC would handle 
supply, maintenance, transportation, and procurement of spare parts and miscellaneous 
items.  This change was very similar to both General Schriever’s un-adopted proposal 
during the Anderson Committee years and to the original format of ASC and MC sharing 
responsibility.  It may have seemed unsure to some people whether we moved forward or 
took a step back in time with this change.  
Although the creation of AFSC and AFLC created organizational stability, the 
concern over PMRT had to be addressed again.  The AFLC commander at the time 
thought PMRT was a bad idea and that one manager should be responsible for both the 
development and modification/sustainment of a weapon system; too much knowledge 
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was lost when PMRT occurred.  It also threw the budget into limbo for sometimes as 
long as two years because AFSC and AFLC were funded from different pots of money. 
 
1970’s 
In the early 1970’s, another study group was formed to look at the AFSC/AFLC 
processes and recommend improvements.  Despite the research performed, no significant 
changes occurred and the organizational problems continued.  In early 1978, with new 
AFSC and AFLC commanders in place, the problem of PMRT was again identified for 
improvements.  The primary focus was to expedite the transfer of weapon system 
programs; over 60 programs were identified for transfer from AFSC to AFLC in the 
following three years.  This was good start but more problems followed with the transfer 
of the TR-1 and the KC-10 aircrafts.  The problems were so severe; another study group 
was formed to assess the program responsibility assignments of these weapon systems.  
This review group suggested a new format of single management of the entire program 
by one office.  It was even suggested that perhaps this new format could apply to other 
weapon system programs in the future.  AFSC thought this was a great idea but AFLC 
did not agree.  AFLC suggested the systems selected were not good examples for this 
new template.  AFSC showed otherwise with a good case example of the time, the B-52.  
Although the B-52 program had transferred to AFLC in 1965, AFSC was still providing 
continuous technical assistance that the program could not have been managed without.   
 
1980’s 
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The latter part of the 1980s brought increased attention to the acquisition 
community.  President Reagan’s arms buildup led to many reports of contractors severely 
overcharging the government and acquisition personnel letting it happen.  Countless 
Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition studies flowed at the same time with little or 
no change until the Packard Commission.   
The most important occurrence in acquisition during this time was the 1986 
President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, more commonly known 
as the “Packard Commission” after its chairman Deputy Secretary of Defense David 
Packard (Carlin, 1992).  The reports from the Packard Commission set the tone for all 
future acquisition reports that followed.  The primary problem identified by the Packard 
Commission was the lack of effective organization in the acquisition community; no 
DoD person, in charge of acquisition, existed to regulate the different branches of 
service.   
The goal of the Packard Commission’s findings was to, “establish unambiguous 
authority for overall acquisition policy, clear accountability for acquisition execution, 
and plain lines of command for those with program management responsibilities” 
(Carlin, 1992).  The position of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition was 
established to oversee DoD acquisition.  Each branch of the military would then appoint 
a Service Acquisition Executive as a subordinate.  The Service Acquisition Executives 
would then appoint a PEO to manage a chosen group of weapon system programs.  The 
direction for future acquisition reform efforts had been established. 
In the same year, Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act.  This act was designed to consolidate acquisition functions primarily 
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by strengthening civilian control over acquisition and reducing levels of bureaucracy in 
the Pentagon.  This would reduce the duplication at the secretariat level and the Chief of 
Staff level.  The new consolidated group was placed under the Assistant Secretary for 
Acquisition and was responsible for over 400 programs.  The AF appointed eleven PEOs, 
mostly commanders of current acquisition organizations.   
The next major step in acquisition reform occurred in 1989 with President George 
Bush’s National Security Review (NSR) 11.  This instructed DoD to “develop a plan to 
accomplish full implementation of the recommendations of the Packard Commission and 
to realize substantial improvements…in defense management overall” (Cheney, 1989).  
The original structure was already in place and now Program Managers (PMs) were 
directed to report to their respective PEO on cost, schedule and performance of their 
respective programs.  This change removed some of the responsibility from the service 
logistical commands and the systems acquisition commands.  Secretary of Defense Dick 
Cheney provided further instructions by recommending establishment of specially trained 
acquisition officers, and further consolidation and streamlining of existing acquisition 
and logistical organizations.  Secretary Cheney stated that these changes would save the 
DoD approximately $30 billion by FY 93.  Secretary Cheney and Deputy Secretary of 
Defense Donald Atwood held a press conference to share this information.  It was during 
this conference that the first mention of merging AFSC and AFLC was presented.  No 
answer was provided at that time because the Air Force would have to conduct a review 
to consider the possibility. 
In the early summer of 1989, the McDonald-Loh study was instituted to study 
(not recommend for or against) the question of merging AFSC and AFLC into the 
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unnamed command of AFXX.  The study was co-chaired by Lieutenant General Charles 
McDonald and Lieutenant General John Loh.  The study identified three major categories 
that the functions of the two commands could be divided into; more of the functions were 
unique to each command than common between both commands.  Some of the unique 
AFSC functions were initial system development, major system acquisition, management 
of the AF science and technology program, operation of AF test facilities and operation 
of the space launch system.  Some of the unique AFLC functions were modifications, 
reliability and maintainability upgrades, the operation of a wholesale and retail supply 
system, and commodity acquisition.  Common functions were resource allocation, 
planning and programming, contracting, the comptroller, program management and 
engineering.   
The McDonald-Loh study also came up with two models of operations that could 
be implemented.  The first was to simply have AFXX as oversight for the contracting 
activity, allocation of work and resources, management of professional development and 
training, management of the infrastructure and oversight of the logistics operations.  
PEOs and product division commanders would be one and the same.  This clearly did not 
follow the new plan for acquisition reform.  The second model, called NSR 11, would 
keep PEOs separate from product division commanders.  The PEOs would manage all 
major acquisition programs with their own staff.  The headquarters of AFXX would 
provide administrative support and direct logistics operations.  The commanders of 
product divisions and ALCs would manage the “non-major” programs, support PEOs and 
PMs, and conduct logistics operations.  This model complied with acquisition reform and 
directed a new command towards life cycle management of weapon systems.  The main 
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concern with NSR 11 was the combination of so many diverse functions.  The final result 
of the study was that the Air Force could implement NSR 11 with or without a merger of 
the commands.  If the merger was chosen though, it would possibly yield substantial 
monetary savings and the AF would have to accomplish a merger very carefully. 
At the same time, the commanders of AFSC and AFLC were voicing their 
opinions that a merger was a bad idea.  In AFLC, General Alfred Hansen stated, “My 
concern is that we will take an efficient logistic structure and destroy it to fix an 
acquisition function that really needs only fine tuning in the AF” (DMR, 1989).  The 
AFSC Commander, General Bernard Randolph, agreed.  Both commanders presented 
success stories of improvements they were making within each command.  AFLC was 
working on network modernization programs streamlining existing logistics processes.  
At the end of 1987, AFSC’s PEOs worked further toward fulfilling the Packard 
Commission goals with streamlining of their command procedures.  Although the cases 
were valid, the possibility of increased functional efficiency and potential manpower 
savings was too strong.  On 7 August 1989, Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) Larry 
Welch broke the news to the AFSC and AFLC commanders that a merger would occur.   
Only a couple days later, the merger was put on the back burner as AFSC offered 
staff and command manpower reductions of ten percent instead.  This counter offer 
would leave AFSC HQ with barely 800 personnel assigned.  An AFSC command wide 
reduction of 5,000 slots was also projected for the coming years.  AFLC followed suite 
and reduced its structure in the areas of staff offices (from 17 to seven), Defense 
Contracting Service (DCS) offices (from nine to five) and direct reporting units (from 23 
to eight).  The personnel reductions in AFLC HQ were projected to be almost 700 slots 
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over the next two years.  The total reductions in both commands were projected to 
eliminate almost 10,000 positions by the end of FY 94.   
Although this effort was noted, the merger wasn’t cancelled.  In the fall of 1989, 
the Comptroller for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) began releasing 
proposals called Defense Management Report Decisions (DMRD).  These documents 
were designed to propose changes that would ultimately increase economy and 
efficiency.  Some of the DMRDs seemed openly hostile to the future of AFSC and 
AFLC.  One DMRD specifically, DMRD 943, called for eliminating most of AFSC and 
then combining the key staff with AFLC.  The idea for AFLC to absorb AFSC was based 
on its larger size and purportedly better organization than AFSC.  The proposed savings 
by FY 97 were estimated at $562M and a position reduction of approximately 1,300.  
DMRD 943 stalled in the Pentagon in late fall of 1990, but by December 1990 talk of 
creating a new acquisition and support command was shared with the key players.  
Neither command was to be absorbed by the other but a whole new command created in 
their place.  The final decision to merge AFLC and AFSC can be attributed to SECAF 
Donald Rice in early November 1990. 
 
1990’s 
General McDonald, Commander of AFSC, and General Ronald Yates, 
Commander of AFLC, were tasked to come up with an integration plan for the combining 
of their two respective commands.  It was determined there were four overall objectives: 
(1) to integrate the work force and resources of the two commands, (2) improve the 
existing business practices by providing a completely integrated weapon system 
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management process throughout a weapon system’s life cycle and (3) to provide a single 
face to operational commands that covers all aspects of integrated weapon system 
management and (4) establish a clear line of accountability and responsibility (Carlin, 
1992).  Five goals were also identified:  to provide total weapon system support to users, 
to enhance the excellence of the work force, to nurture aerospace technology, to fulfill all 
aerospace logistics needs, and to establish a world class quality organization and 
infrastructure.  Even with clear objectives and goals, it was challenging to combine the 
personnel of two commands who had previously looked at weapon systems from 
different perspectives.  The official announcement of the merger was on 3 January 1991, 
with scheduled steps to the establishment of the new command on 1 July 1992.  Wright-
Patterson Air Force Base (WPAFB) was chosen over Andrews Air Force Base as the HQ 
location. 
The initial cost projection for the merger was $14 million, primarily for 
movement of personnel to Ohio, both civilian and military.  The groundwork for the new 
command was performed by a special team, unofficially referred to as the “Magnificent 
11.”  The team consisted of four AFSC members, four AFLC members, two Air Staff 
members and one member from the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA).  The team did an 
outstanding job anticipating problems, using historical lessons, and ultimately building 
the new command.  They also selected the final name choice, AFMC from a list of five 
options that were presented to Secretary Rice a few months prior.  
The team broke their job down into special tasks in the format of a Work 
Breakdown Structure.  The team considered their primary tasks to organize the HQ and to 
find a way to implement Integrated Weapon System Management (IWSM).  Organization 
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of the headquarters was tackled by Mr. Keith Dumas (Assistant DSC Plans and Programs 
from AFLC) and Brig Gen John Nauseef (DCS Financial Management from AFSC).  
Dumas-Nauseef decided to have each of the deputy and assistant chiefs design their own 
offices with guidance letters for assistance.  Quality was designed into the new format 
instead of inspecting for quality after the fact.  The guidance letters were a tool to ensure, 
“the headquarters offices conformed to the basic stipulations of the new command” 
(Carlin, 1992, p. 43).  This included answering a detailed questionnaire as a requirement 
with your final input of proposed ideas.  For the issues that needed to be settled, it was 
determined a meeting of all the senior officials was necessary.  An advisory committee 
was formed of senior leaders (EXCOM) to work with Dumas-Nauseef.  Several meetings 
were held that united the senior officers from AFSC and AFLC as a new command.  With 
all this oversight, General Meyer was concerned the EXCOM might stifle the creativity 
of the integration team (Carlin, 1992, p. 45).  General Yates again emphasized to the 
integration team to remember to be creative. 
It was time to start moving people to Ohio but a concern was raised about 
assigning everyone to AFLC just because it was already there.  Instead, a provisional 
AFMC headquarters was established at WPAFB to start the process.  In this way, 
personnel would become part of AFMC instead of either command feeling absorbed by 
the other.  The provisional headquarters lasted from 15 April 1991 to 30 June 1992.  
While in effect, the skeleton staff of the provisional headquarters laid the groundwork for 
each type of office in preparation for their successors.  The heart of the provisional 
headquarters included financial management, manpower and personnel.  Along with this, 
the concept of integrated staff ensured AFSC and AFLC functional chiefs prepared joint 
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transition plans for the phased transfer of people and tasks into the new headquarters 
(Carlin, 1992, p. 47).  This ended up being very successful.  As the different areas were 
divided into groups, DCS/Requirements stood out as the organization that would truly 
blend the perspectives of the two old commands.  DCS/Science and Technology brought 
in the AFSC side while DCS/Logistics brought the AFLC portion.  The final structure of 
the new command was completed on 21 May 1991 and approved by General Meyer with 
only slight modifications on 6 September 1991. 
Manpower considerations also had to be addressed.  The combined force of AFSC 
and AFLC was approximately 2,600 people.  It was decided this figure would gradually 
decrease over the next year to avoid a reduction-in-force (RIF) to get to the goal of 2,100.  
AFSC previously had an almost equal number of military and civilians; AFLC previously 
had significantly more civilians than military.  Generals Yates and McDonald agreed to 
30% military and 70% civilian ratio for AFMC.  Of course, the entire relocation process 
was significantly harder for the AFSC folks who were not already in Ohio.  They were 
concerned about having to move and that AFMC might just be AFLC "disguised."  
General Yates announced that all civilians willing to move to Ohio were guaranteed a job 
in the new command.  If a civilian job was considered a transfer of function (TOF) (not a 
job already in Ohio), employees who chose not to move would not have RIF rights and 
would be placed in other positions at Andrews Air Force Base.  If a civilian job was not a 
TOF, employees declining to move were given RIF rights.  AFSC personnel were moved 
to another temporary organization known as Detachment One until they could be 
assigned to AFMC. Out of the 538 civilians who could have moved, 424 chose not to 
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move.  This 79% non-relocation of personnel alleviated a lot of other potential concerns 
about a huge influx of personnel. 
 
Integrated Weapon System Management Challenges 
The greatest challenge of the new command was Integrated Weapon System 
Management (IWSM), labeled the heart of AFMC by General Yates and General 
McDonald.  Of the one and a half years spent on formal planning and preparation for the 
new command, three months were dedicated to developing the basic concept of IWSM.  
General Alfred Hansen, the AFLC Commander from 1987-1989, strove to remove seams 
and disconnects from logistical functions and was the first to use the term IWSM (Carlin, 
1992).  The position of system Program Manager (PM) was created to strengthen the 
control of PMs in the 1980’s.  Over the years, the term IWSM expanded to include more 
than just logistical functions.  An AFLC Process Action Team announced that their 
overall objective was to “baseline requirements processes as they should work in the 
product division concept to position and empower the weapon system management 
organization to act more like a SPO.” (Carlin, 1992 p 58)  This new concept was 
expanded as the two commands were joined.  It appeared AFLC was becoming more like 
AFSC in operating principles.  IWSM was defined as “empowering a single manager 
with authority over the widest range of weapons system program decisions and resources 
to satisfy customer requirements throughout the life cycle of that weapon system.” 
(Carlin, 1992 p 59)  Certainly there was risk in the single manager approach but in the 
end it was concluded that it possesses the same leaders and personnel with an approved 
organizational structure and communications.  Integration planners had high hopes for 
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the possibility of a single manager being responsible for weapon systems from cradle to 
grave, presenting a single face to the user, eliminating the need for PMRT and creating a 
seamless organization.  Hopefully, this single manager concept would also fully integrate 
logistics support for initial and replenishment supplies.  In order to turn this concept into 
a reality, eight core processes were identified to fit all the elements of managing a 
weapon system.  The final list consisted of:  Requirements, Management, Financial 
Management, Systems Engineering and Configuration Management, Test and Evaluation, 
Contracting, Technology Insertion, and Logistics. 
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Integrated Weapon System Management Development 
After three months of developing IWSM, the next 15 months (April 1991 – June 
1992) were dedicated to examining and documenting the processes that would make the 
IWSM concept work.  This time period of “Process Development” consisted of four 
phases.  First there was program analysis to examine the sub-processes involved in each 
program to integrate a way to manage that program by each process.  Second, program 
integration identified management tasks, the most effective organization and 
responsibilities, and location of the designated single manager for each program.  Third, 
the process analysis phase consisted of Process Action Teams (PAT) looking at each of 
the eight core processes.  Lastly, in process integration, the findings of the PATs would 
be utilized to facilitate the establishment and continuing operation of the new command.  
(Carlin, 1992, p 61)  The whole process was outlined in a roadmap as a type of charter 
for the development of IWSM.   
The IWSM project managers had their own tasking, to select programs as 
candidates to test the new approach.  Programs selected were required to be connected to 
both AFLC and AFSC, representative of activities performed at both logistic and product 
centers, representative of all phases of the life cycle, and made up a variety of weapon 
systems, items and customers served.  The final selection consisted of 16 weapon system 
programs.  As recommendations were made for single manager locations, the IWSM 
steering committee realized it had to identify its vision of the long-term relationship of 
logistics and product centers.  It came up with six possible options but found that it was 
not easy to come to an agreement of how to organize the new command.  Some of the  
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discussions were very heated as workload and jobs became key factors.  The committee 
did not want to see the logistic centers become only repair depots with all program 
management ending up at the product centers.  On the other hand, if program 
management automatically moved with the system when it became operational, product 
centers could end up almost non-existent. 
General Yates and General McDonald spent several weeks reviewing the issues 
raised by the IWSM steering committee.  They revised the roadmap and produced a new 
memorandum of agreement to outline changes to the future course of IWSM.  It was 
decided that the program managers would initially be placed at the product centers but 
would work closely with the logistics centers as well. When a program reached 
“maturity,” the manager would move with the program to the logistics center.  Programs 
that had already been partially or completely transferred would be handled individually.  
Another major change was the inclusion of Air Force Communications Command 
(AFCC) in the IWSM experiment; this would add 5 additional AFCC programs to the 16 
test programs selected for IWSM.  The question of AFCC’s fate had already been under 
discussion with the combination of AFLC and AFSC.  A study was undertaken to look at 
“organizational alternatives leading to the merger of AFSC/AFLC/AFCC C4 elements 
under AFMC.” (Carlin, 1992, p 68) 
 
Integrated Weapon System Management Obstacles 
As the IWSM experiment progressed, various obstacles arose.  Valuable time was 
wasted when it was initially assumed that the IWSM steering committee would designate  
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the single managers.  In reality, only the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for 
Acquisition, John J. Welch, Jr. had the authority to do this.  There were also different 
procedures in place in the different commands that would need to be reorganized.  Some 
of the affected processes involved contracting, systems engineering, configuration 
management, and technology insertion.  The overall goal was a clear, consistent approach 
that all parties could agree on.  One of the largest problems was financial management.  
In the past, Congress gave large sums of money to AFSC for development of a product 
that it could spend freely; AFLC was not given the same freedom.  Its money was divided 
in separate pots for separate functions; this made it difficult to transfer funds between 
pots.  Sorting out all the funding issues was a huge challenge.  
By the end of 1991, the 21 candidate programs were well on their way into the 
IWSM approach.  A second edition of the roadmap was also produced to include what 
had happened so far.  This document defined the SPO as “the integrated AFMC 
organization responsible for cradle to grave military system management” (Carlin, 1992).  
The System Program Director (SPD) was defined as “the individual in an AFMC SPO 
who is ultimately responsible and accountable for decisions and resources in overall 
program execution…the single face to the user who oversee the seamless processes…the 
SPC is the designated title for the single manager of a program who reports to a PEO or 
Designated Acquisition Commander.” (Carlin, 1992) 
Along with Roadmap II, a White Paper was put out by General Yates and General 
McDonald on the IWSM effort, the future of the Air Force and the pending establishment 
of AFMC.  Policy formulation ensued and continued through AFMC’s activation.  Still a  
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lingering concern was the management position of the logistics centers, which was not 
clearly stated.   
 
AFMC:  The New Command 
During the creation of AFMC on 11 July 1992, the IWSM controversy remained 
intense.  That same day, Secretary Rice and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General 
Merrill McPeak, produced a policy memorandum on their views of the roles of the 
product and logistic centers.  As soon as General Yates took command of AFMC he 
issued a policy letter to clear up any misunderstanding regarding management.  Weapon 
system management would be conducted at both product and logistics centers.  The 
extent to how this would be implemented was the only part that was still undefined.  This 
unresolved issue simmered for the next several years. 
Three key elements of AFSC were used as the backbone of AFMC strategic 
planning.  The first was known as Command Management Framework.  This consisted of 
four major parts of AFMC’s mission: science and technology, systems acquisition, test 
and evaluation, and base operating support.  The goal was to focus attention where it was 
needed for success in these areas.  The second was a quarterly conference called 
Horizons.  Each conference would address one of the four mission areas so all four would 
be covered each year.   The third was the implementation of metrics.  Although it was 
clear that metrics should be a tool for measuring progress toward a goal, no specific 
structure was specified. 
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For the entire year prior to AFMC activation, General Yates conducted off sites 
specifically to address the new command. These four conferences created the statements 
of mission, vision, goals and objectives endorsed by the commander.  The group was 
focused on providing lasting capabilities to AFMC customers.  Some obstacles were 
found in decreasing workforce and funding levels; increasing environmental costs; lack 
of funding flexibility; the size, diversity and complexity of the command they were 
creating; and the sheer number of initiatives that were being proposed in the name of the 
new command. (Carlin, 1992)  After much discussion, five goals were decided upon that 
were broad enough to apply to the entire command.  The AFMC vision was also 
developed, “Be an integrated team delivering and sustaining the best products for the 
world’s best Air Force.” (Carlin, 1992)  The mission statement developed was, “Through 
integrated management of research, development, test, acquisition, and support we 
advance and use technology to acquire and sustain superior systems in partnership with 
our customers.  We perform continuous product and process improvement throughout the 
life cycle.  As an integral part of the Air Force war fighting team, we contribute to 
affordable combat superiority, readiness and sustainability” (Carlin, 1992).  It was 
decided that the objectives had to be not only meaningful, but quantifiable and 
measurable, applicable throughout the command, understandable at all levels, be of 
enduring importance, reflect consensus, contain a target date for completion when 
appropriate, and be directly related to the five goals.  The hard part was figuring out how 
to measure progress towards a goal.  General Yates himself observed that, “we can 
expect to revise the metrics 100 times.” (Carlin, 1992) 
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As the activation date drew closer, General Yates remained focused on integrating 
acquisition and logistics into one unified command.  Logistics was renamed sustainment 
and the proposed direction included integrated processes between the two areas. This 
would continue to evolve as the new command matured. 
In 1998, a group of senior AFMC planners undertook a reexamination of the 
roles, responsibilities and relationships within the organizational structure of the 
command. (Carlin 2001)  This new concept was titled Centers of Excellence (COE).  It 
was realized that AFMC was not operating as efficiently as it should be and IWSM was 
not working as designed.  In some ways, AFLC and AFSC were still operating 
independently within AFMC.  After designing a new framework, the whole idea was 
completely abandoned as AFMC feared congressional opposition to making changes. 
A major incident occurred in 1998 that caused a new look at the engineering of a 
weapon system.  A B-1B bomber crash, due to a fire in the plane’s electrical system, 
started an inquiry into the safety engineering of the system.  The assignment and 
understanding of responsibility for this accident was questioned; AFMC was the owner 
of the weapon system and therefore considered responsible for its flight and ground 
safety.   
General George Babbitt, AFMC Commander at the time, pronounced the PEO 
system to be a dysfunctional mechanism that worked because people made it work. 
(Carlin, 2001)  General Babbitt felt that the reporting responsibilities of single managers 
needed clarification.  This was a question AFMC thought they had answered back in 
1992.  He directed product center technical responsibility for comprehensive insight into 
their product line, including periodic evaluation of a product line’s technical “health” and 
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the chief engineer in support of a single manager is responsible and accountable for the 
operational safety, suitability, and effectiveness of their weapon system throughout the 
life cycle.  (Carlin, 2001)   
In July 2001, AFMC sponsored the creation of the Depot Maintenance Review 
Team (DMRT).  Their primary objectives were to improve depot maintenance support to 
the warfighter and improve depot maintenance financial performance (McCoy, 2003).  
The depots focused on reengineering their processes to reduce flow time and increase 
production.   The original DMRT evolved into Depot Maintenance Reengineering and 
Transformation, which looked at workload and production, workforce, materiel support, 
financial management, infrastructure, information technology, organizational structure 
and metrics.   
With the tragedy of September 11, 2001 still fresh in everyone's minds, AFMC 
took another look at the way they did business.   
General Lester Lyles, AFMC Commander at this time, stated "The 
administration is setting new priorities and a new strategy for the nation's 
defense.  The recent terrorist attacks on America dramatically and tragically 
emphasized the need for these changes.  We in AFMC need to help shape and 
lead that change by acquiring and sustaining the new capabilities the Air 
Force will need in the future to maintain its dominant combat edge.  If we're 
to continue providing world class materiel support to our customers, we must 
clearly understand their changing requirements and periodically review how 
we do business," (Faulkner, 2001).   
 
To fulfill the mission of homeland defense is a two-step process for AFMC.  First 
is the "pull" where the warfighter establishes requirements for new technologies.  Then 
comes the "push" when AFMC provides the solution.  AFMC has many technological 
programs and initiatives that can be provided at increased speed when there is a  
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requirement and funding is made available.  AFMC has sustained the capabilities that 
were dominant in major conflicts like Desert Storm, Deliberate Force, Allied Force, 
Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom (Martin, 2004i).  Through the establishment of the 
Homeland Defense and Combat Support Sector within XP, AFMC hopes to ensure 24/7 
capability to respond to critical requests. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
83 
 Appendix B: Survey Instrument 
2004 AFMC Product Center  
Reorganization Survey 
 
 
Purpose:  The purpose of this survey is threefold: (1) to determine if the 2004 AFMC Product Center 
reorganization has met General Martin’s four intended objectives, (2) its effects on AFMC employee job 
satisfaction and (3) to gather some general opinions about the reorganization.  The four objectives are 
clearly stated within the survey itself.   
 
The data collected will be used to identify any areas that may need additional attention as a result of the 
reorganization.  The analysis of the data collected, corresponding research, and conclusions reached will be 
documented within a current AFIT student thesis. 
 
This survey has been endorsed by HQ AFMC/XPM for distribution throughout the AFMC Product 
Centers.  To access the survey simply click on the link listed below.  The survey itself should take no 
longer than 10 minutes. 
  
Participation: Your COMPLETELY VOLUNTARY participation is greatly appreciated.  Your decision to 
not participate or to withdraw from participation will not jeopardize your relationship with the Air Force 
Institute of Technology, the U.S. Air Force, or the Department of Defense.  
 
Confidentiality: We ask for some demographic information in order to interpret results more accurately; 
ALL ANSWERS ARE ANONYMOUS.  No one other than the research team will see your completed 
survey.  Various reports summarizing trends may be published as part of the thesis process. 
 
Contact information: Any questions or comments about the survey, please contact Capt Joy Mikulcik at 
joy.mikulcik@afit.edu.  
 
Web Link to Survey: XXXXXXXXXXXXX 
 
 
 
Captain Joy Mikulcik 
AFIT/ENV   BLDG 641 
2950 P Street 
Wright-Patterson AFB OH  45433-7765 
Email: joy.mikulcik@afit.edu 
Phone: DSN 785-3636, ext. 6553, commercial (937) 255-3636, ext. 6553 
Fax:  DSN 986-4699; commercial (937) 656-4699 
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Please respond to the following statements based on the scale provided: 
 
1 
Strongly  
Disagree 
2 
Disagree 
 
3 
Slightly  
Disagree 
4 
Neither Agree 
Nor Disagree 
5 
Slightly 
Agree  
6 
Agree 
 
7 
Strongly  
Agree 
 
 
General Martin’s Objective 1: We wanted to strengthen support to operational commands and 
warfighters in the field.  AFMC’s number one job is to deliver war-winning capabilities on time and 
on cost.  If we can’t do this for all weapon systems then we are no adding value. 
 
1.  I feel the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization has succeeded in strengthening support to 
operational commands (ACC, USAFE, PACAF, AFSOC, AMC, AFSPC) 
2.  I feel the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization has succeeded in strengthening support to 
warfighters in the field 
3.  My organization has experienced improvements in cost management as a result of the reorganization 
4.  My organization has experienced improvements in schedule management as a result of the 
reorganization  
5.  My organization has experienced improvements in its ability to deliver war winning capabilities as a 
result of the reorganization 
6.  I feel the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization has strengthened our support to operational 
commands because they better understand where and how to find acquisition assistance 
 
 
General Martin’s Objective 2: We must continue supporting and maturing the PEO realignment.  
This will continue the age-old debate of when an acquisition program shifts into the sustainment 
phase. 
 
7.  Overall, I feel well informed of the PEO realignment changes 
8.  I feel the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization has supported the PEO realignment 
9.  I feel the PEO realignment has matured as a result of the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization 
10.  I feel the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization has detracted from supporting the PEO 
realignment 
11.  I am well informed of the changes in PEO functional areas 
12.  I am well informed of the changes in PEO chain of command 
13.  I feel when the PEO functions were less effective when they were in Washington, 
DC (SAF/AQ) 
14.  I feel PEO functions are now at the right levels in AFMC 
15.  My organization has experienced significant changes in acquisition program management as a result of 
the PEO realignment 
16.  I feel the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization has improved our communication with SAF/AQ 
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Please respond to the following statements based on the scale provided: 
 
1 
Strongly  
Disagree 
2 
Disagree 
 
3 
Slightly  
Disagree 
4 
Neither Agree 
Nor Disagree 
5 
Slightly 
Agree  
6 
Agree 
 
7 
Strongly  
Agree 
 
General Martin’s Objective 3: The need to structure AFMC similar to the way all other Air Force 
major commands operate.  The incorporation of the standard wing/group/squadron structure will 
make it easier for people to understand AFMC.  It will also ease in identification of responsibilities of  
each organization. 
 
17.  I feel the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization has successfully restructured AFMC similar to 
all other Air Force MAJCOMS 
18.  I support the standardization of wing, group and squadron titles 
19.  My organizational structure positively changed as a result of the 2004 AFMC Product Center 
reorganization 
20.  I clearly understand the new structure 
21.  My reporting chain positively changed as a result of the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization 
22.  I clearly understand my new reporting chain 
23.  I have a positive opinion about the removal of the organizational title “System Program Office (SPO)” 
24.  I feel the new structure allows me to work more effectively 
25.  I feel the new structure allows me to work more efficiently 
26.  I feel the new structure makes it easier for other MAJCOMs to find and communicate with AFMC 
offices 
 
 
General Martin’s Objective 4: We must structure the command with a capability-based versus 
platform-based focus.  Rather than having separate organizations for every weapon system, they will 
be grouped based on similar capabilities.  Platforms can then share the responsibility and knowledge 
base among similar systems. 
 
27.  I feel the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization has successfully created a capability-based 
versus platform-based focus 
28.  I felt the previous platform-based focus was working well for AFMC 
29.  I feel the new capability-based focus is working well for AFMC 
30.  I feel my organization is now grouped more effectively with other capabilities 
31.  I feel my organization is now grouped more efficiently with other capabilities 
32.  I feel the new capability-based focus make sit easier to communicate and share ideas across programs 
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Please respond to the following statements based on the scale provided: 
 
1 
Strongly  
Disagree 
2 
Disagree 
 
3 
Slightly  
Disagree 
4 
Neither Agree 
Nor Disagree 
5 
Slightly 
Agree  
6 
Agree 
 
7 
Strongly  
Agree 
 
General Questions: 
33.  I feel the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization has met its intended objectives 
34.  The 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization has improved my morale at work 
35.  I feel the Product Centers are more effective under the new structure 
36.  I feel the Product Centers are more efficient under the new structure 
37.  I feel my organization has adapted fairly easily to changes related to the reorganization 
38.  I feel I was well informed about the objectives/goals of the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization 
PRIOR to any actual changes occurring 
39.  I feel I was well informed about the actual changes that would occur in the 2004 AFMC Product 
Center reorganization PRIOR to any actual changes occurring 
 
Job satisfaction questions: 
40.  I am satisfied with my current job 
41.  The amount of work I am expected to do at my job is reasonable 
42.  I am satisfied with the amount of resources I have to do my job 
43.  I feel my job is important to the organization 
44.  I get a sense of satisfaction from the work I do 
45.  I can get my job done in a normal duty day timeframe (8 hours) 
46.  I am proud to work in AFMC 
47.  I am satisfied with the level of work required for my job 
48.  I know what my job responsibilities are 
49.  I often have to bend a rule or policy to get the job done 
50.  I am able to act independently of my supervisor in performing my job 
51.  I can help in making decisions, which affects my work in a positive manner 
52.  I don’t mind spending additional hours at work to complete my tasks 
 
Organizational Commitment: 
53.  I feel secure with my job as long as I am getting the work done 
54.  If another organization offered me a promotion or pay raise I would leave 
55.  Management at my organization acts sincerely 
56.  I really feel as if the organizations problems are my problems as well 
57.  I don’t feel a sense of pride or accomplishment as a result of the work I do 
58.  I feel I have too few options to consider leaving this organization 
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Demographics: 
59.  What is your age?  
o 19 or younger 
o 20-29 
o 30-39 
o 40-49 
o 50-59 
o 60 or older 
60.  What is your gender?  
o Male 
o Female 
61.  What is your marital status?  
o Single 
o Married 
o Divorced 
o Widowed 
62.  Civilian or Military?  
o DoD Civilian 
o Retired military member now working as a civilian 
o Retired military member now working as a contractor 
o Active duty officer (not prior enlisted) 
o Active duty officer (prior enlisted) 
o Active duty enlisted  
o Contractor 
63.  Rank? _____ 
64.  AFSC/Occupational Code?_____ 
65.  Level of Education?    
o GED/High School 
o Some College 
o Associated Degree 
o Bachelors Degree 
o Graduate Degree 
o Doctorate 
o Other 
66.  Time in current position? _____ year(s)  ____ months 
67.  Years assigned in AFMC(includes AF Systems Cmd and/or AF Logistics Command)? ____ year(s)  
____ months 
68.  Years in other Air Force Commands? _____ year(s)  ____ months 
69.  Years assigned to Secretariat or Headquarters for the USAF?  _____year(s)  ______ months 
70.  Total time working for the Air Force (combine military and civilian duty)? _____ year(s)  ____ 
months 
71.  What is your current AFMC Product Center duty location: 
o Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 
o Electronic Systems Center, Hanscom AFB, MA 
o Air Armament Center, Eglin AFB, FL 
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Open ended questions: 
72.  What is working well for you as a result of the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization? 
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________ 
 
73.  Please identify any areas of concern for you as a result of the 2004 AFMC Product Center 
reorganization. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________ 
 
74.  Please tell us anything else about your experience with the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization 
that you think we should know for future reorganization improvement. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Definitions: 
Matured - to evolve toward or reach full development 
Successfully - having succeeded or being marked by a favorable outcome 
Effective - producing or capable of producing a desired effect 
Efficient - acting or producing effectively with a minimum of waste, expense, or unnecessary effort or 
exhibiting a high ratio of output to input 
Capability Based - grouped by like use, design or specific purpose (fighter attack, training, etc.) 
Platform Based - each item has its own intended military structure or vehicle and typically does not share 
information with others 
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Appendix C: Human Subjects Training Certification 
 
 
CITI Course in The Protection of Human Research Subjects  
 
 
Tuesday, December 20, 2005 
CITI Course Completion Record 
for Joy Mikulcik  
 
To whom it may concern:  
On 12/20/2005, Joy Mikulcik (username=jmikulcik; Employee Number=) completed all CITI 
Program requirements for the Basic CITI Course in The Protection of Human Research Subjects. 
 
Learner Institution: U.S. Air Force  
Learner Group: Group 5  
Learner Group Description: This course is suitable for investigators and staff conducting 
research with human subjects at the AIR FORCE RESEARCH LABORATORY (AFRL) and for 
investigators and staff at other sites conducting RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TESTING, AND 
EVALUATION (RDT&E) activities with human subjects.  
Contact Information:  
Gender: Female  
Please Provide Your Current Performance Site: USAF Research Laboratory at Wright 
Patterson AFB  
Department: AFIT  
Which course do you plan to take?: Air Force Research Laboratory Course  
Role in human subjects research: Student Researcher  
Mailing Address:  
  
Email: joysjm@sbcglobal.net  
Office Phone: 937-848-4423  
Home Phone:   
 
The Required Modules for Group 5 are:  
Date 
completed  
Introduction  12/19/05  
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History and Ethical Principles - SBR  12/19/05  
Privacy and Confidentiality - SBR  12/19/05  
Basic Institutional Review Board (IRB) Regulations and Review Process  12/20/05  
Informed Consent  12/20/05  
Social and Behavioral Research for Biomedical Researchers  12/20/05  
Records-Based Research  12/20/05  
Research With Protected Populations - Vulnerable Subjects: An 
Overview  
12/20/05  
International Research  12/20/05  
Workers as Research Subjects-A Vulnerable Population  12/20/05  
Conflicts of Interest in Research Involving Human Subjects  12/20/05  
U.S. Air Force  12/20/05  
Additional optional modules completed:  
Date 
completed  
Defining Research with Human Subjects - SBR  12/20/05  
For this Completion Report to be valid, the learner listed above must be affiliated 
with a CITI participating institution. Falsified information and unauthorized use of 
the CITI course site is unethical, and may be considered scientific misconduct by your 
institution.  
Paul Braunschweiger Ph.D. 
Professor, University of Miami 
Director Office of Research Education 
CITI Course Coordinator  
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Appendix D: Human Subjects Request for Exemption and Amendments 
 
19 Sep 05 
 
 
MEMORANDUM FOR  AFIT/ENV 
        AFIT/ENR 
        AFRL/HEH  
        IN TURN 
            
FROM:  AFIT/ENV/GRD  
 
SUBJECT:  Request for Exemption from Human Experimentation Requirements (AFI 
40-402): Thesis Research, AFIT/ENV, 2004 Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) 
Product Center Reorganization Survey 
 
1.  Request exemption from Human Experimentation Requirements of AFI 40-402 for the 
proposed 2004 AFMC Product Center (PC) Reorganization Survey (attached) to be 
conducted in conjunction with thesis research at the Air Force Institute of Technology.   
Purpose of this study is to determine if the 2004 reorganization of AFMC PCs has 
successfully met the AFMC/CC’s four key objectives:  to strengthen support to 
operational commands and warfighters in the field, to continue supporting and maturing 
the PEO realignment, to structure AFMC similar to the way all other Air Force major 
commands operate and to structure the command with a capability-based versus 
platform-based focus.  The results of this study will be utilized by AFMC/XPM as input 
data for SAF/AQ to gauge the success of the PC reorganization. 
 
2.  This request is based on the Code of Federal Regulations, title 32, part 219, section 
101, paragraph (b) (2); Research activities that involve human subjects will be exempt 
when the research involves the use of survey procedures provided (i) information 
obtained cannot be directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects, and (ii) 
disclosure of subjects' responses does not place the subjects at risk of criminal or civil 
liability, financial strain, employability or reputation ruin.   
 
Methodology used to collect information for organizational theory research is based on 
survey procedures. The following information is provided to show cause for such an 
exemption: 
  
2.1. Equipment and facilities:  No special equipment or facilities will be used. 
 
2.2. Subjects:  Subjects will be employees of AFMC Product Centers.  HQ 
AFMC/XPM will send the link to the web-based survey, via electronic mail, to 
the Product Center commanders for distribution to all employees.  
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2.3. Timeframe: Data will be collected via online survey over a period of 5-10 
days 
 
2.4. Description of the survey:  The survey is broken down into seven main 
sections to measure different areas:  Objective 1, Objective 2, Objective 3, 
Objective 4, job satisfaction, organizational commitment and demographics.  
Each section has specific measurable variables selected based on their correlation 
to the overall section descriptor.  Personal information will remain anonymous. 
 
2.5. Data collected:  No identifying information, such as names or social security 
numbers, will be obtained through this survey.  Data collected on individual 
subjects includes: Age, Gender, Marital Status, Civilian or Military, Rank, Years 
of Education, Duty Location, Years in Job, Years in AFMC, Prior Military 
Service, Years in AF/government work, etc.  All final data will be reported 
collectively. 
 
2.6. Informed consent:  Subjects selected will include all employees of the AFMC 
Product Centers.  Since respondents will only answer voluntarily there is a 
concern that the response will be biased.  No adverse action will be taken against 
those who choose not to participate.  Subjects are made aware of the nature and 
purpose of the research, sponsors of the research, and disposition of the survey 
results.  A copy of the Privacy Act Statement of 1974 is presented for their 
review.   
 
2.7. Risks to Subjects:  Individual responses of the subjects will not be disclosed.  
This eliminates any risks to the subjects as noted in paragraph 2.  There are no 
anticipated medical risks associated with this study. 
 
3.  If you have any questions about this request, please contact the Faculty Advisor, 
Major Carolyn Macola – Phone 785-3636 x4511; E-mail – 
Carolyn.macola@afit.edufit.edu or the Graduate Student, Captain Joy Mikulcik – Phone 
684-7652, E-mail – joy.mikulcik@afit.edu. 
 
      //signed// 
      JOY D. MIKULCIK, Capt, USAF 
      Graduate Student, AFIT/ENV/GRD 
 
      //signed// 
CAROLYN M. MACOLA, Maj, USAF 
      Faculty Advisor, AFIT/ENV 
 
Attachment: 
2004 AFMC Product Center Reorganization Survey  
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29 September 2005 
 
 
MEMORANDUM FOR AFIT/ENV 
    AFIT/ENR 
    AFIT/HEH 
    IN TURN 
 
FROM:  AFIT/ENV/GRD 
 
SUBJECT:  Amendment to Human Subject Review case F-WR-2005-0066-E (2005-
040):  Thesis Research, AFIT/ENV/GRD, 2004 Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) 
Product Center Reorganization Survey 
 
1.  Request approval of amendment to Human Subject Review case F-WR-2005-0066-E 
(2005-040):  Thesis Research, AFIT/ENV/GRD, 2004 Air Force Materiel Command 
(AFMC) Product Center Reorganization Survey. 
 
2.  Therefore, please amend as follows: 
a. Please remove the attachment that was submitted 
originally and replace with the survey attached.  Attached 
is a revision of the original proposal.  The revisions include 
1) the deletion of one of the survey questions, (“Unit 
currently assigned to),” and 2) change of spacing of 
questions to improve readability 
 
3.  If you have any questions about this request, please contact Capt Joy D. Mikulcik 
(Joy.Mikulcik@afit.edu) or Maj Carolyn M. Macola (937)255-3636 ext. 7386 
(Carolyn.Macola@afit.edu)  
 
 
//signed// 
Joy D. Mikulcik, Capt, USAF 
Graduate Student, AFIT/ENV/GRD 
 
 
//signed// 
Carolyn M. Macola, Maj, USAF 
Faculty Advisor, AFIT/ENV 
 
Attachment: 2004 AFMC Product Center Reorganization Survey 
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AppendixE: HumanSubjectsApproval- AFRL
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR FORCE MATERIELCOMMAND
. WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE OHIO
03November2005
MEMORANDUMFOR:JoyD.Miku1cik,Capt,USAF
AFIT/ENV/GRD
FROM:AFRL/WtightSiteInstitutionalReviewBoard
SUBJECT: Requestforexemptionfromhumanexperimentationrequirements
1..Protocoltitle: 2004Air ForceMaterialCOlllilland(AFMq ProductCenterReorganization
Survey
2. Protocolnumber:F-WR-2005-0066-E
3. TheaboveprotocolhasbeenreviewedbytheAFRL WrightSiteIRB anddeterminedtobe
exemptfromIRB oversightandhumansubjectresearchrequirementsper32CFR219.101(b)(2)
whi<;;hexempts"researchinvolvingtheuseofeducationaltests(cognitive,diagnostic,aptitude,
achievement),surveyprocedures,interviewproceduresorobservationofpublicbehavior."
4.Datacollectiontorthisstudycanbeginimmediately.TheIRB mustbenotifiedif thereisany
changetothedesignorproceduresoftheresearchtobeconducted.Otherwise,nofurtheraction
isrequired.
5. Forquestionsorconcerns,pleasecontacttheIRB administrator,HelenJenningsat(937)255-
0311x232orhelen~iennings(cV,~1Jafb.af.mi1.All inquiriesandcon-espondenceconcerningthis
protocolshouldincludetheprotocolnumberandnameoftheprimaryinvestigator.
-.,/
JEFFl\EY BIDINGER,Maj,USAF,MC,FS
Chair,AFRL/WrightSiteIRB
II
f
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Appendix F: Human Subjects Request for Approval and Amendment - AFPC 
 
17 October 2005 
 
MEMORANDUM FOR  AFPC/DPSAS 
                    
FROM:  CAPTAIN JOY MIKULCIK 
 
SUBJECT:  Request for Survey Control Number for 2004 Air Force Materiel Command 
(AFMC) Product Center Reorganization Survey 
 
1.  Please consider this letter as a formal request for a survey control number.  As part of 
my graduate degree thesis I would like to conduct a web-based survey.  The tentative 
administration date for the survey is November 2005. 
 
2.  Pursuant to AFI 36-2601, paragraph 2, the following information is provided: 
2.1 State the purpose and justification for the proposed research (include 
name of AF sponsor and how agency will benefit from the survey findings): The 
purpose of this study is to determine if the 2004 reorganization of AFMC PCs has 
successfully met the AFMC/CC’s four key objectives:  to strengthen support to 
operational commands and warfighters in the field, to continue supporting and maturing 
the PEO realignment, to structure AFMC similar to the way all other Air Force major 
commands operate and to structure the command with a capability-based versus 
platform-based focus.  Sponsorship of this survey is provided by HQ AFMC/XPM, 
Colonel Dan Badger and Lieutenant Colonel Kimberly Daeger. 
2.2 Indicate how you will use the survey results: The results of this study will 
be utilized by AFMC/XPM as input data for SAF/AQ to gauge the success of the PC 
reorganization and for me personally to fulfill the thesis requirement for graduation from 
the Air Force Institute of Techology with a masters degree in Research and Development 
Management in March 2006. 
2.3. Provide a POC with phone number: If you have any questions about this 
request, please contact my Faculty Advisor, Major Carolyn Macola – Phone 785-3636 
x4511; E-mail – Carolyn.macola@afit.edufit.edu or myself, Captain Joy Mikulcik – 
Phone 684-7652, E-mail – joy.mikulcik@afit.edu. 
2.4. Identify which population is of interest, how large the proposed sample 
size is, and how the sample will be selected:  Subjects selected will include all 
employees (civilian, military and contractors) of the AFMC Product Centers.  Their 
responses will be completely voluntary.  The approximate number of personnel contacted 
will be 5,250.  This includes approximately 850 personnel at the Air Armament Center 
(AAC), Eglin Air Force Base, Florida; approximately 2,450 personnel at the Aeronautical 
Systems Center (ASC), Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; and approximately 1,950 
personnel at the Electronic Systems Center (ESC), Hanscom Air Force Base, 
Massachusetts. 
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2.5  Tell how you expect to collect the data, such as computer-administered 
survey, mail-out survey, etc.:  Data will be collected via online survey over a period of 
5-10 days.   
2.6  Provide a copy of the proposed date collection instrument: please see 
attachment. 
2.7. Specify when and how often people will be surveyed:  Respondents will 
only be surveyed once, tentatively scheduled for early November. 
 
3.  If you have any questions about this request, please contact me directly at (937) 684-
7652 or via e-mail at joy.mikulcik@afit.edu.  Thank you for your help 
 
 
 
      //signed// 
      JOY D. MIKULCIK, Capt, USAF 
      Graduate Student, AFIT/ENV/GRD 
 
 
Attachments: 
1.  2004 AFMC Product Center Reorganization Survey  
2.  Human Subjects Request for Exemption Letter 
3.  Amendment to the Human Subjects Request for Exemption Letter 
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25 October 2005 
 
 
 
MEMORANDUM FOR AFPC/DPSAS 
 
FROM:  CAPTAIN JOY MIKULCIK 
 
SUBJECT:  Amendment to Request for Survey Control Number for the 2004 Air Force 
Materiel Command (AFMC) Product Center Reorganization Survey 
 
1.  Request approval of amendment to Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) Product 
Center Reorganization Survey request submitted 17 October 2005.  A revised copy of the 
survey instrument is attached. 
 
2.  Changes include the addition of one question: 
 
71.  What is your current AFMC Product Center duty location? 
? Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright-Patterson AFB, 
OH 
? Electronic Systems Center, Hanscom AFB, MA 
? Air Armament Center, Eglin AFB, FL 
 
3.  If you have any questions about this request, please contact Capt Joy D. Mikulcik 
(937) 684-7652 (Joy.Mikulcik@afit.edu) or Maj Carolyn M. Macola (937) 255-3636 ext. 
4511 (Carolyn.Macola@afit.edu)  
 
 
//signed// 
Joy D. Mikulcik, Capt, USAF 
Graduate Student, AFIT/ENV/GRD 
 
 
//signed// 
Carolyn M. Macola, Maj, USAF 
Faculty Advisor, AFIT/ENV 
 
Attachment: 2004 AFMC Product Center Reorganization Survey 
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Appendix G: Human Subjects Approval – AFPC 
 
 
14 DECEMBER 2005 
 
MEMORANDUM FOR CAPT JOY D. MIKULCIK 
FROM: AFPC/DPAPS 
SUBJECT: Request for Survey Approval 
 
We have reviewed your request to conduct the 2004 Air Force Materiel Command 
(AFMC) Product Center Reorganization Survey and approved it for use for Air Force 
personnel assigned to the Air Armament Center (AAC) at Eglin AFB; the Aeronautical 
Systems Center (ASC) at Wright-Patterson AFB; and the Electronic Systems Center 
(ESC) at Hanscom AFB.  We have assigned a Survey Control Number (SCN) of USAF 
SCN 05-130; valid through 30 June 2006.  Please ensure that the SCN and expiration 
date appear within the survey, survey instructions and appropriate web site as well as on 
the initial document/e-mail introducing the survey.   
With regard to the survey and its associated results, it is important to draw your attention 
to the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).  Under the FOIA, the public 
can request the results of your survey.  Furthermore, if the results will be released outside 
the Air Force, please follow proper approval procedures through Public Affairs before 
the results are released. 
Questions or concerns can be directed to me at DSN 665-2448.  We wish you 
much success with your data collection effort. 
 
//Signed// 
LOUIS M. DATKO 
Chief, Air Force Survey Program 
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Appendix H: Human Subjects Completion Letter 
17 February 2005 
 
 
MEMORANDUM FOR  AFRL/HEH 
                    
FROM:  AFIT/ENV/GRD 
    2950 Hobson Way 
    WPAFB, OH 45433  
 
SUBJECT:  Final Report for 2004 AFMC Product Center Reorganization Survey 
 
Status of study:  Completed. 
 
 
 
//signed// 
JOY D. MIKULCIK, Capt, USAF 
Graduate Student, AFIT/ENV/GRD 
 
 
 
//signed// 
CAROLYN M. MACOLA, Maj, USAF 
Faculty Advisor, AFIT/ENV 
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Appendix I: Answers to Survey Question Number 72 
 
Question 72.  What is working well for you as a result of the 2004 AFMC Product Center 
reorganization? 
 
• It had absolutely no impact on my work. Change was just cosmetic from my stand 
point. 
• I was unaware of the changes since I recently arrived at AFMC. My experience 
has been the "grumblings" of co-workers who seem to collectively view this as a 
change for the sake of change. 
• I'm in a staff position, so I've not seen a lot of change/impact on my office. 
• Wing, Group, Squad, Flight re-org 
• Capability and Results Focus 
• Having the PEO local is definitely beneficial. 
• Users better understand our organization structure with Wing/Group/Squadron 
structure. 
• Ability to work well with others to complete my job. 
• Having the PEO local works well for program decisions and information passing, 
but leaves a hole in the Washington arena for program advocation. 
• Senior Leadership involvement 
• Opportunities for Military Command slots for our AD military officers. 
• I have not really seen much improvement (as far as my job area is concerned) 
from the previous organizational structure. 
• Definitely more priority to meet the users need- -mission orientation-strategic 
focus/results oriented -performance based incentives 
• It is more in line with the rest of the military structure so it is easier to understand. 
• The commanders assigned at the squadron level are a move in the right direction. 
• I'm getting commander credit which is important in the rest of the AF. 
• Nothing has changed other than organization names. 
• Promotion potential. 
• Much more "busy" work 
• My job is to support my customer in a technical support role. The re-organization 
just complicates my daily work schedule with all the additional overhead. 
• Nothing changed within organization, just confusion on "who are we today" 
(what title, numbered or not)? So work goes on. 
• The whole system seems to work well. I entered the AF after the PEO 
realignment and in the beginning of the restructuring into Wings. So, I didn't 
know the organizational structure prior to the changes. But, it makes sense to me 
how it is organized now. 
• Making the Product Center Commander the PEO and grouping weapon systems 
according to their function. (This was accomplished before and without becoming 
Wings, Groups, Squadrons and Flights!!!!!) 
• A lot of people can't find what org I am in know so I don't get as many calls. 
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• This kind of stuff is well and good but for most of use we could care less as long 
as the work we do is of value. For the junior force, it's just another waste of 
government money trying to improve already broken government processes. It's 
like all that strategic plan stuff no one reads. Who cares where the PEO sits, it's 
still just as hard to get something through OSD no matter where someone is. 
• The initiative to group similar weapons capabilities into the same organization 
has been very helpful in sharing very useful business and technical information. 
• For the most part line control of employees 
• Essentially, nothing has changed for my position as an engineer. My 
responsibilities did not change, nor did my reporting chain. So, things remained 
status quo. Things were going smoothly before and after the change. 
• Generally, don't see much change. 
• I do understand the sq/wg structure better than the old SPO names. I agree with 
functionally aligning similar projects in the same 'wing'. I like the Weapons PEO 
being here at Eglin where the weapons are planned, developed, tested, and 
acquired. We brief him regularly (6/times/yr) and discuss issues. Makes more 
sense than being in Wash DC. 
• Better team work effort due to all playing on the same team. 
• Little change. The deck chairs have been rearranged 
• More opportunities for deserving military members to assume command 
positions. 
• Less cumbersome policies and procedures; first class learning organization--
training is key to enhanced job knowledge and increased productivity 
• Because of the new wing structure, there are greater opportunities within the 
organization which may be taken advantage of without a lot of paperwork or 
administrative headaches. 
• Very little as a result of the reorganization, which was one of the typical periodic 
reshuffles making it look like leadership is doing something important, but that 
really makes the bureaucracy even worse to deal with. 
• Nothing!!! 
• Focus at multiple levels on personnel. 
• Nothing! I lost my supervisory position after 15 years. I was moved out of my 
career field. I have been placed in an oppressive organization with little in terms 
of goals and visions and micromanagement for transactional functions. IT 
support, resources and capabilities are a mere shadow of what I was accustomed 
to having. I no longer know what office to contact for what and many people have 
been shifted thus losing the continuity that once existed. Gen Anzalone once 
announced at a public meeting that the purpose of the reorg was to provide 
military a career path. It was "hoped" that the new civilian system, NSPS, would 
provide for them. I see many leader positions being filled by military very junior 
and not knowledgeable compared to the civilians in that organization. The 
military are receiving credit for the work of the civilians and have a path while 
many good civilians suffocate. NSPS will only exasperate the situation by 
creating the biggest "good old boy" system known to the Air Force. 
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• In spite of the reorg, the capabilities based focus works. 
• Really I have seen very little change in anything that affects me. My disagree 
statements were not that things were going bad, but basically that I disagree that I 
see anything going better because of the re-org. I would say that the best benefit 
from the re-org would be that younger officers may have stronger promotion 
potential. 
• Nothing changed for me as a functional, other than the confusion of the new 
names. 
• Knowledge 
• Having the PEO at Hanscom is a big improvement over the old model. Our PEO 
has a lot more involvement in the programs in his portfolio than he would 
otherwise. 
• Being briefed and aware of the current changes 
• Not answering this question but overall comment: If the definitions below were at 
the beginning of the questionnaire, I missed them. If you have a chance, I would 
move them to the front of the instrument. The capability based improvements 
outweigh any of the negatives associated with the reorganization. I question the 
time energy and cost to the tax payer with the reorg in general. I believe we could 
have achieved the same outcome with less negative impact to the organization. 
• Consistency of Wing, Group, Squadron structure across the Air Force. 
• Understanding an actual chain of command. (although, you still have multiple 
reporting chains--PMs, CFOs, FM functionals, Group, Wing agencies outside of 
your chain) 
• Organizational/reporting structure is a lot clearer 
• I know very little about the reorganization. My squadron is a tenant unit of the 
AAC Eglin, and was already structured with Wing, Group, Squadron, and Flights 
(to a certain extent). 
• My job really didn't change as I work for a "Functional" organization. 
• The wing/group/sq structure provides a great sense of camaraderie 
• I see the reorganization as an unnecessary step backward that was motivated 
primarily to create more Commander positions for field grade officers. 
• In my last job, the AFMC structure was more recognizable to the operator -- less 
ambiguous. 
• The program that I work seems to have higher visibility. 
• The Major AF Product Centers reorganized IAW General Martins & AF 
Organizational Structure 
• No significant changes. 
• Wing structure makes communication easier. Integration among like systems. 
• I better understand Industry 
• Morale at ESC has been bad for years, so it is hard to determine what can be 
attributed to the reorgs. 
• Nothing very much! I miss the SPO organization structure. 
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• Not much there still seems to be confusion. I will grant you the fact that at least it 
is organized now. 
• Minimal changes at the office/working level--maintains work continuity. 
• In my position as Human Resources Manager for one of the functional areas, I 
now deal directly with the 4 Wing CFO's, as opposed to the 8-10 SPO CFO's. 
That gives me less people to negotiate with, but it also gives me less flexibility. 
• There is no detectable positive change. 
• The movement of the PEO from DC to the product center headquarters was good. 
• Clear lines of communication. 
• Co-located PEO with program offices. 
• Knowing where to get answers for air to ground or air to air. 
• Better training, improved communications across orgs, improved speed to get the 
work done 
• Chain of command reporting. 
• There are clearer lines on command. It's just too bad not everyone uses them. 
 
92 respondents selected “no answer” to this question. 
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Appendix J: Answers to Survey Question Number 73 
 
Question 73.  Please identify any areas of concern for you as a result of the 2004 AFMC 
Product Center reorganization.  
 
• I was assigned as the Director and then CC for a SPO from May 03 - Jun 05. 
Although we reorg'd the levels of reporting did not decrease. The intermediate 
level actually became more controlling; I and my successor ask "why do you even 
need us?" 2) I do not believe the Wg, GRP, SQDR designation will help acq orgs 
execute any better, in fact, I believe it will take away managements attention of 
cost, schedule, performance, issues. 
• Negative impact on morale. From what I've observed, the message either didn't 
get out or didn't make a lasting impression on the workforce. 
• Getting all the organization names nailed down - figuring out who is who. Also, 
there is still confusion regarding the authority of the Wings/DRG versus the ALC 
-- who's the boss? Growth of employees via moving around to gain different 
experiences is more difficult now that the "functional" director no longer "owns" 
the positions. This also makes it more difficult to backfill key positions (by 
moving from one Wing/DRG to another) when people are promoted, retire, or 
otherwise leave the organization -- limits flexibility. 
• Going back to PMRT type or relationship between AFMC development and 
sustainment organizations. Worst decision was to take away the cradle-to-grave 
management structure that put one belly button over organizations regardless if 
they were development or sustainment! 
• Lack of culture change within work force, unethical leadership, lack of promotion 
opportunities within Group 
• I can no longer identify what anyone does. It makes it harder to determine who is 
in acquisition and who is not. 
• The removal of the term SPO is confusing to many people and we have to explain 
it to our customers often. 
• Too few people to get the job done 
• Seeing others being promoted before me just because they work in a SPO while I 
am in a support organization (Pricing). This is very disheartening to me and to all 
Pricing personnel. No matter what we do we cannot win! Supervisors who rate 
you the same as the person before--no matter what you accomplish. Even if you 
have worked in all areas of contracting (SPO, Lab, etc.) and you have had the top 
rating, whenever you move your rating goes down automatically and it tends to 
stay there--not really fair at all!! It means you cannot compete with the SPO 
personnel who tend to get top grades at all times. 
• Changes from SPOs to Group/Wings has done actually worsened an outsider's 
ability to identify who does what within AFMC. Wing/Grp names are generic and 
do not create the clear phonebook Gen Martin often alluded to. In addition, we 
have now split the baby so many different ways (UMD, functional allocations and 
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responsibilities); I feel we have significantly sub-optimized the Center's ability to 
perform resource leveling. Ownership of authorizations by these new mini-
wings/grps has only exasperated the rice-bowls that existed under the SPO 
organizations. The reorganization also has not been resource neutral with each 
organization looking out for themselves, in that each new organization is 
attempting to become self-sufficient. As a result, each commander is building a 
support structure for the care and feeding of a smaller entity (compared to the 
previous functional matrixed arrangement.) I could go on, but one can extrapolate 
on the inefficiencies of taking larger organizations and breaking them up in to 
numerous very small self sustaining entities. 
• Split responsibilities for similar systems (sustainment vs. development) resulting 
in duplication of responsibilities and duplication of efforts. 
• Two areas - First, by standing up a wing level in the center organizational 
structure, we added another layer of staffing, and sourced that staffing from the 
old SPOs. Our overall line versus staff ratio has decreased, and the program 
offices have loss billets and experience to set up the wing staffs. The group staffs 
by and large are the old SPO staffs. Secondly, if we gave the Wing CC/Director 
PEO authority for the lesser ACAT 3 programs, we could regain some of the 
inefficiencies the new wing structure has levied on the center. 
• Consistent disagreement between Product and Logistics Centers regarding who 
does what, who will take what and the definition of sustainment, acquisition, 
development etc... Also not sure why we have stated that the Wing/CC is not in 
the Acq chain of command -- why remove a link in the chain -- it's not like that in 
Operational structures. 
• It is my opinion that we are now in the wing/group/squadron organizational 
structure but we are still acting like SPOs. There are too many people who may 
have been in the systems world too long or have never been in an operational 
environment and as a result, they have no clue how the interaction between 
wings/groups/squadrons really work...in an operational environment. 
• -Application of policy: development to development centers/sustainment to the 
sustainment centers. -Lack of human resources at the product centers -Reluctance 
to change 
• Size of work force needs to be addressed. Acq reform cut workforce to low. 
• People are getting OPRS, etc signed at lower levels. In the long run, this will be 
good, but some people will be hurt during the change. Also, I don't think AFMC 
has really figured out how they're going to treat command billets. In the rest of the 
AF, it's a 2 yr billet, yet I'm being told I could stay in it for my whole assignment 
(3-4 yrs). That would cheat other people of the opportunity to be a commander, 
and commander jobs are usually limited to 2 yrs because people need a break. 
Being a commander is significantly different than being a PM or SPD, but we're 
still treating them as the same thing. My last concern is that organizations are not 
standardized. What constitutes a group at one product center would only be a 
squadron at another--no standard criteria ($$ amounts, number of people, number 
of programs etc.) between product centers. Seems like it was based more on "How 
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many command billets did a product center get?"--let's organize around that 
number. 
• We seem to have some kind of "change" every 2 to 4 years--but at the working 
level, all that changes is nomenclature. Usually the change in names is a waste of 
time and energy. 
• Not enough work and too many people to include SETA support. 
• increased levels of management have resulted in more micromanagement 
• Too many layers of management now. I.e. Flight leader, Squadron leader, Group 
Leaders, Wing leaders, each with a staff and execs???, who is doing the work?. 
All want briefed on program status, delays quick communication with user, all 
outgoing info must be coordinated thru all levels. 
• -Chain of command, way too much management! -Dealing with other groups 
(SPOs) and organizations is much more difficult. -It's harder now for others to 
figure out what AFMC does! Numbering the groups complicates the problem 
further. 
• Additional layers of bureaucratic management were added to justify additional 
AF civilian supervisor positions. No value added. The management chain is 
cumbersome, lethargic, and unwieldy. Responsibility and independent thinking is 
not allowed without first checking with higher HQ. Squadron CC positions are 
hollow and are name only dept titles, not real commanders like in a flying 
squadron. No G-series orders nor orderly room authorized, hence the cc has no 
UCMJ authority, which is the true test of command authority. Total 
mismanagement of AFMC. Morale is lower than anytime before. 
• Incorporating all the "rah-rah"/legacy stuff which adds nothing to doing my job. I 
served in combat units in my previous life so I know what legacy means. 
Assigning combat unit designations to acquisition organizations doesn't change 
the king's clothing--a SPO is still a SPO no matter what you call it; e.g., SPO 
people don't get shot!! 
• User will eventually not have a clue on who to contact. If we're the "802 ASS" 
(armament system sqdn), what does that mean to ACC if we're actually the JDAM 
SPO. Old titles conveyed direct meaning on who we are. Remember, most 
important connections are at worker level, not just GO's knowing which wing 
commander to call... 
• One concern is placement of future programs that may not fit exactly into one of 
the groups formed based on commonality of systems. I suppose if that situation 
arises though, a new group can be formed to support that new program and new 
capabilities. 
• International Squadron created under the Air to Ground Wing, however, 
personnel were kept in the respective groups. International Squadron just added 
another layer of coordination and one more staff meeting to attend and prepare 
charts for--no value added. 
• Under new structure--seems like there are too many managers. We have 
functional area managers at the group level (FM/PK/LG)(GS-14) and then at the 
107 
wing functionals again (GS-15). Not really sure how the introduction of the wing 
concept has help the group (formerly SPO) more productive. 
• The restructure into Wings, Groups, Squadron and Flights is a farce!!! This along 
with the restructure at our using command ACC has really messed with the 
workers' minds. We are still working with the same folks as before---they and we 
just don't know who we are!!! The Group, Squadron and Flight office symbols 
still have not changed. "Haven't been approved yet"???? 
• People can not find people any more. It has been difficult locating people in other 
organizations, not knowing what they are in now. I need to contact a lot of people 
in different Org., and I have found this to be my worst area since reorg. 
• It appears to be a lot of resources unnecessarily expended............ 
• Greatly increased overhead and associated oversight has decreased the ability to 
respond in a timely manner 
• The exchange of information between weapons' groups and aircraft groups is still 
not as effective or as efficient as is needed to meet the users' needs to defend our 
country as quickly or as affordable as the taxpaying citizens deserve. 
• Under the new structure, the Wing/Group CC controls the UMD slots, removing 
the functional home office from any decision regarding resources. Wing/Group 
CCs have the best interests of THEIR organization at heart, rather than the best 
interests of AAC. This results in fewer rotations of personnel for career 
broadening, as the CCs now decide who they will allow to move and who they 
will retain. Currently, there are NO individuals qualified to become PCOs in my 
organization. There are several individuals in other organizations who are well 
qualified, but cannot move because their CCs refuse to release them and the PK 
home office, not having control of the UMD, cannot force a move. The Center 
Commander has been unwilling to intervene. This results in more work for 
existing PCOs, who must take-up the slack. We are now in a situation where we 
will give warrants to the best candidate available, instead of the best candidate in 
the Center. 
• No UCMJ authority for Wing /CCs, Additional layers of management, more 
bloated staffs Wings are created to be able to be picked up and moved in their 
entirety, Business organizations(and let's face it, AFMC is by and large a 
business) are designed to share personnel and functional resources across 
divisions without having to duplicate expertise and functions in each 
organization. We've shoe-horned a business entity into an operational structure 
and it doesn't fit. If one of the major reasons for restructuring was to look like the 
rest of the AF so the war fighter’s would understand AFMC, wouldn't it have 
made more sense to just educate the other commands? 
• I'm not sure of the value of the change to producing our products more efficiently. 
It seems false reasoning to me to say that the acquisition field needs to "look like 
the rest of the operational AF" so that they can better identify with us. While there 
are advantages to the metric system, I don't have any trouble remembering that 12 
inches are in a foot and 3 feet are in a yard. 
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• See some duplication of effort between staffs and multiple wings; used to have 
one office providing service, now that is duplicated in each wing. 
• All of the Centers still have their separate org's: whether it's a wing or a SPO, they 
still work for an O-6 or GS-15. Hard to say that the reorg creates more effective 
or efficient environment - it's probably the same, just with new (but better) names. 
• Insufficient training/mentoring of persons now in supervisory or "chain of 
command" positions. The "system" did not groom people for these positions, thus 
we will struggle with inexperienced (read inept in too many cases)people making 
less than optimum decisions because they somehow think that position 
equivocates to knowledge. It does not. 
• Front end planning prior to Milestone A is not consistently implemented. The 
Organization structure is different at each of the Centers. The relationship of the 
planning activity to the AFMC Commander vs the PEO is not clearly understood 
or implemented. I do not think that the Jul 2003 Memo for Record signed by the 
CSAF and SAF stating that "The Commander of AFMC is responsible for front-
end planning prior to Milestone A as user's requirements are being defined..." is 
understood by the users or well defined within AFMC as part of the AF 
Capability Planning Process. 
• The General does not see himself as a tenant on another's installation, though 
technically he is. And there's good reason for this--many view him as still 
responsible for the installation, though technically he doesn't have authority. 
Worse, with the reorganization of the Center, it is harder to get through to see 
him. Where once we worked directly for him, now for some issues to see him I 
have to meet first with a Director, the Group Commander and the ABW 
commander, often in that order. This takes additional time and effort and yet 
produces no greater benefit. 
• Changed for the wrong reasons. Saw the clamor for "Commander" and little else 
changed about the overall attitude. Felt the Center commander and AFMC 
Commander had sincere intentions. Too many opportunists morphed the 
commanders' visions. 
• Creation of an additional level of bureaucracy with new Wing and Group 
structure in addition to the former SPO structure, that is still there, just not called 
"SPO". Removal of highly qualified people from former SPOs to populate the 
Wing/Gp staffs Conflict with DP over grade structure based on number of direct 
reports and conflict between functional and line-management organizations 
caused by the reorganization 
• Need to use metrics to determine the quality and value of products produced; is 
the customer satisfied? senior military officer turnover--too frequent resulting in 
instability and a lack of continuity; the product centers need good, stable military 
leadership from the commander down to the lieutenants 
• The original renaming of the organizations caused some confusion with our 
warfighters in the field as well as the Army, Marines and Navy organizations we 
deal with. The current approach of going to a numbered Air Force like the 
operational commands is going to be much worse. I have had some very adverse 
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feedback from my other service counterparts. A direct quote from an Army 
person at Redstone Arsenal is "This is dumber than dirt". Titles are important and 
the ability to immediately know what system the organization is responsible for 
without consulting a master checklist (which may be unavailable or outdated) is 
only part of the issue. 
• Many of the day-to-day tasks were over looked. Even though "wings, groups, and 
squadrons" were established they are not complete. They do not have 
commanders on "g-series" orders. Things like orderly rooms, first sergeants, 
vehicle control officers and unit training managers were not considered. If your 
wing does not have a VCO you may spend days looking around for a unit who 
has one who is willing to sign your forms to get a government drivers license. As 
a military person I still have to deal with multiple chains of command. For my 
daily work assignments I may work for the "Air-To-Ground" wing commander. 
However, for any legal issues I have to contact a first shirt and a commander in a 
different unit’s orderly room who takes care of us as an additional task. Those are 
just a few examples. 
• There are many, but I can't say I'm really concerned, as I plan to get out of here as 
soon as I'm retirement-eligible. 
• All!!! 
• Loss of focus on program management by most senior/seasoned acquisition 
professionals. Attention is constantly diverted to wing/group/squadron 
responsibilities. 
• Don't know how the decision was made to identify an office as a wing vs. group 
vs other -- based on dollars spent, political oversight, number of employees, etc.? 
Affects how one feels about the office they are working in and potential 
promotion opportunities. 
• Civilians are getting deputy positions rather than director positions. Looks like we 
are going to all military for commanders of groups, wings, etc. 
• Long delays in restructure below wing level, and Center-level restructure still 
pending -- organizational identities and individual contacts lost, org charts still 
TBD, many interim and obsolete names and symbologies are still in use. Severely 
limited my ability to maintain or re-establish "official" contacts, chains of 
command. I think this whole exercise is another change for the sake of change. I 
see no value whatsoever. 
• Hidden costs. The cost of the reorg has not been seen. There has already been 
grade creep and increased layers of management put in place. As these 
organizations mature staffs will become heavier because the "zero" growth rule 
will be a thing of the past. 
Turmoil in the workplace continues to degrade our ability to perform up to our 
ability and desire. Define turmoil as the continuing flood of seemingly irrational 
taskings, requirements, training, surveys and other distractions that prevent us 
from sticking to Job #1 as outlined in our PD's. 
• We did not more easily identify ourselves to our customers; AQ still says - oh 
yeah, you used to be SPO Yxxx. It was not resource neutral - whenever you build 
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organizations, you build fiefdoms - you now have many fiefdoms conflicting with 
functionals instead of a core functional staff supporting many offices focused on 
producing a product. The reorg took the focus off the programs for some senior 
acquisition folks. 
• This change was non value added from my view. 
• communication 
• The reorg has been extremely costly to both the programs and the people with 
little to no benefit to show for it. Each program is being assessed to fund these 
grotesque staffs at the wing & group level. I strongly feel that the Center, and the 
program offices, functioned much much better under the old organizational 
structure. 
• The Wing has seemed to place an additional layer of bureaucracy on top of the 
program offices. When the DoD is trying to decentralize control of the programs, 
their goal was to reduce bureaucracy, but the opposite has occurred. 
• The Wing they assigned my office to does NOT fit in with what we do 
• Do not know enough about what happened. I really didn't notice any difference. 
• Very difficult to understand what organization's new office symbols and 
organizational alignment are. 
• Overhead has increased as a result of the re-org 
• There are a lot more layers of coordination/approval to go through; there seems to 
be a lot more duplication of effort 
• Wing structure creates bureaucracy and overhead. The product center should be 
run like a business or any other corporation, organized around product lines, and 
focused on corporate profitability. For us corporate profitability is the ability to 
field systems at the lowest cost possible. If it were up to me, product centers 
would compete for work with other product centers. 
o Geographically separated units that have no in-house legal support in 
places where there should be day to day interaction with active program 
offices. (2) The restructuring (both at the AFMC PC level and the PEO 
level) has program offices going through more layers of management then 
ever before. For instance, you have DFSG/PN going to DFSG and through 
its structure, to OSSW and its structure, and then finally to ESC proper 
and its structure. (3) The delegations from the PEO or the commander 
levels have become difficult to figure out. 
• The reorganization created another level of bureaucracy that adds no significant 
value to mission accomplishment. 
• Structure of the OSSW Wing! Too large (span of control) for coordination 
matters -- too many layers -- too spread out. Needs to be examined and 
reconfigured -- maybe even divided into "2" parts. 
• Too many layers of Bureaucracy NO LG/A4 at ESC No Logistics Emphasis at 
any level. All/Most ESC Logisticians are contractors (95%) 
• There is nothing intuitive about the changes. Nothing seems to flow in a logical 
way. The standard structure is being forced on an organization which is in fact 
different from the operational Air Force. 
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• We're trying to integrate a Tactical Datalink Network (TDN) "capability" on all 
USAF Platforms. However, the Platforms don't recognize the shift from Platform 
based integration to Capability based integration. Many, if not all, of the Platform 
PM's do not appreciate our involvement in "their" Platform. Their lack of 
cooperation inhibits our ability to substantiate/defend the funding required to 
integrate this capability into their Platform, as result we constantly have our 
funding cut which adversely affects the Platforms. The TDN AFI and the TDN 
AFPD, which defines MAJCOM roles and responsibilities, needs to be signed at 
the highest levels to mandate cooperation ASAP. 
• How does this action keep the AF relevant with regard to current events facing 
the nation? 
• Reorg cannot fully accomplish goals of integration because of the nature of the 
funding system. Not an issue with reorg per se, but something that should be 
tackled at the higher levels. We are going after the personnel system (NSPS) so 
let's revamp the PPBS next! 
• SETA contractors making and influencing decisions that are in their best interest, 
not the USAF. 
• My functional used to be a matrix. The reorg has created little dictatorships, and 
added another level to the reporting/suspense chain. 
• It was bad enough when we had to learn the new Wing/Group naming 
convention, but now I heard we are scraping that for a numbering identifying 
naming convention. I hope this isn't going to be something similar to TQM or 
other poorly executed management decisions. 
• Yes a major area of concern is that its not a full integration with the operational 
world. We only go as far as Sqd CC's? Why is that? Is there a reason we do not 
want our junior officers (Maj and Capts) to have Flight Commander status? 
• I was present for a realignment of test centers within AAC and significant 
downgrading of positions within the civilian workforce occurred. 
• There is more bureaucracy and layers of management to get through then there 
were before the reorg. My chain of command hasn't changed because I'm in a 
Staff organization; however, I hear all the grumblings of those in the program 
offices and how their workload has increased because of more levels of 
management. Things take longer to get through the red tape now than they did 
before because more people are involved in the process. 
• The redesignation of SPOs to wings and groups provided for numerous wings 
with only several hundred people assigned to each, an unnecessary proliferation 
of wing-level units. I believe a better approach would have to create an 
acquisition wing at each product center in which the SPOs would have been 
groups. 
• Positions and functional areas have been created to "save" jobs as opposed to 
streamline the business. 
• Civilian "Commanders" of Wings/Groups/Squadrons. 
• Too much work load, not enough people to do the job. Need to stabilize 
organizations titles. 
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• Staffing a package to AQ now requires heroic efforts--AQ has to be "informally" 
checked with before the PEO signs. There are still the un-clear lines of command, 
and petty food fight between AFMC and AQ. We need a clear chain of command 
in the field. The reorg didn't do it--made it less clear 
• Too few workers for increasing work requirements, poor quality physical work 
environment, increased mandatory requirements [time consumers: mandatory 
trainings, audits, defending audit findings] equals decreased amount of time to get 
the work done. Drastically less mil, A&AS and civ manpower, high turnover of 
military members, loss of experienced civilian workers to other State and Federal 
orgs and to commercial jobs. Training and technology doesn't make up for 
eroding quantity of resources. 
• The new Wing Structure was put in place, which placed another level of overhead 
in between the SPD and the PEO. This additional administrative overhead was not 
budgeted for (or at least appeared not to be), and the "Group" organizations were 
expected to provide funds to pay for this new structure. Additionally, I'm in an 
organization that resides under a Group, but was not identified as a Squadron, so 
we are still a division. If the reorganization was meant to emulate the standard, 
Wing/Group/Squadron structure, then what does our user/warfighter think a 
"Division" is? Finally, a cross reference matrix of organizational name and 
responsibility changes. Before I could find people in the global in a particular 
organization because I knew what aircraft platform they supported. With the 
change to "Numbered" organizations, it is not readily evident whom that 
individual is working for. 
• The reorganization has still not been fully completed.  ESC. PK and FM 
functional still refuse to fully comply with the AFMC CONOPS. They still 
control all of the Contracting and Finance personnel as if they were there own 
instead of the Wing to which they are assigned. Wings are dabbling in execution 
when they should be focused on organizing and equipping. Our UMD is still not 
where it should be and the POM process was a disaster. 
 
79 respondents selected “no answer” to this question. 
113 
 
Appendix K: Answers to Survey Question Number 74 
 
Question 74.  Please tell us anything else about your experience with the 2004 AFMC 
Product Center reorganization that you think we should know for future reorganization 
improvement.  
 
• Too many name changes in such a short time has only added to confusion within 
and outside the Command. Our warfighter Command counter parts, at least from 
my experience, find the numerous name changes our attempt to look like them 
amusing. They also have the perception we reorg'd to mask our faults -- Druyan 
backlash. 
• A survey such as this should be performed ahead of the change. This would allow 
the people expected to make the change and eventually benefit from it to voice 
their opinions. The results should be carefully considered before making 
sweeping changes to organizational structure. I was very disappointed when I 
arrived at AFMC to find out that there was a MAJCOM change which was going 
thru seemingly without any support or input from the people it affected. Also, 
during all of my inprocessing, no one ever mentioned a reorganization. AFMC 
should be spreading the word at each base either in person or electronically. 
• It seems that we make these changes to be known for something different as we 
progress through our career. I have seen all kinds of reorganizations and changes. 
The Air Force is in a cycle. Each person would like to leave his mark without 
checking historical data prior to making the decision. Changing to numbers has 
no reality for an acquisition environment. I do believe that moving the PEO's 
closer to the field was a good idea. 
• The realignment of management was helpful, but changing the names to numbers 
will not get us anywhere. Numbers are not descriptive to the human mind. 
Imagine if we went by social security numbers instead of names. 
• Communication of the changes was handled well. Believe the key is to tell early 
what is planned and continue giving updates on the status of the reorganization. 
• In my years with AFMC I have witnessed a re-organization / change in strategic 
focus about every 2-3 years. How successful would a large firm be if they 
changed their strategic focus every 2-3 years. It takes that long to simply 
implement the changes. I realize that the world is changing very quickly and we 
must adapt to this to remain on top, but so must every private business also. We 
must develop a strategic business focus that can be executed and not discarded 
every 2-3 years and focus our energies on flexing with the changing threat 
environment. A productive, learning organization not focused on names, 
commanders, etc can be created and I think we can grow and improve far beyond 
the "clear phonebook", "Business Area", or "Mission Area" concepts. AFMC is 
part of a military organization, but it is the business arm of the AF and by 
definition is different than the Tip of the Sword and it difference should become 
it's strength not it's weakness as many allude. 
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• Better define the interface between organizations such that MOAs and 
Memorandum of Agreements are not needed for specific programs. 
• Desire HQ AFMC to step forward to adjudicate manpower positions when work 
transfers. It should not be the responsibility for one center to agree, disagree, 
approve or disapprove of the quantity and mix another center has stated they need 
to execute a mission. 
• -Be consistent- the more you allow for exceptions to policy the more meaningless 
all this reorganization becomes. 
• AFMC needs more field experienced logisticians in the acquisitions process. 
Acquisition Reform cut the working levels to low and we lost a large portion of 
our experience personnel. We need to return to the manpower levels and core 
knowledge of how Air Force operates when dealing with both active base units 
and dealing with the acquisition process 
• I still think the main redeeming quality of the reorg will be to define a baseline 
program office size and then use that to drive billet moves between organizations 
as work loads change. 
• Let's go back to SPOs to define functional areas. At least we'll know who does 
what and who to contact to work together! 
• Seems to me the Wing/Group/Squadron structure is another way to provide jobs 
for additional senior gov't/civilian folks. From the bottom looking up, I don't see 
what our SES wing guy adds to the process. People get things done--not 
organizations. 
• By creating Wg/Gp/Sq, you've created a "pecking order" on which SPO's are 
more important than others. ACC may not always feel that way. If resources fall 
according to your title (i.e., top folks go to Gp over Sq, or Wg over Gp), user may 
not get the support they require from a SPO. 
• Very few people were having any problems with the structure of the Product 
Centers with the possible exception of Operational Members sitting on Promotion 
Boards. But then, they have problems accepting the importance of their own 
Commands non flying jobs. This probably could have been better accomplished 
by educating the folks on the Promotion Boards of the involvement and 
responsibilities of the non flying jobs. 
• Don't assume that reorganization equals progress........... 
• Competition and recognition among the squadrons, groups and wings are good as 
long as the common good for all is not lost. 
• The functional home offices are dinosaurs; relics of the past, serving no useful 
purpose. Their past function was to ensure the Center had the functional resources 
necessary to get the job done. With the new structure, the CCs have a very 
myopic viewpoint, caring little for the Center well-being. They should either be 
eliminated to save resources, or should have their responsibilities restored. 2. The 
justification for the AFMC reorganization was eyewash. The true reason for this 
reorganization will only be known by the AFMC leadership. While the warfighter 
might no understand SPOs, they didn't need to. ACC understood the organization 
very well, and served as the go-between for the warfighter and SPOs. I will never 
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understand why every new Commander believes a new organizational structure 
will ensure their legacy, when improving the efficiency and accountability is what 
really counts. The new organization does neither. We are making changes for the 
sake of making changes. 
• I noticed that the reorganization seemed to place the PEO back at the Center 
Level, just like it was in the '70s. So, took us 30yrs to go full circle. I guess this 
means that in 2030 the PEO (or whatever the position is called then) will be 
moved back to the Pentagon, so save yesterday's organizational charts. 
• Be more discriminating when selecting persons for flight/group/wing commander. 
Rank and time in grade does not equal competence. Some people should be left as 
Majors or GS-9s. We have only started to feel the negative effects of the reorg. 
• In the last 4 years our organization has changed name and structure 3 times. More 
energy and management time and effort went into reorganization than acquisition 
• Accountability is not there. A foundation without firm, concise and understood 
"simple metrics" will evolve to entropy. 
• It would be useful to start looking at organizational structure from the bottom up 
rather than the top down. After all, it's the people on the bottom who actually do 
the work. If you want to enhance efficiency, try it that way. The current structure 
is all about the prestige, convenience and careers of the SES'ers and GO's (and 
those who want to be SES and GO). It does not fool most of us at all. 
• These constant reorg's waste time and resources. They cause confusion here and 
with others. They cause extra layers of management and build new empires, all of 
which, costs money, time, and resources. They also lower moral and cause more 
work for the rank and file. 
• Having worked many years in operational MAJCOMs, I feel those customers 
would have never wanted such a large level of AFMC resources focused on this 
reorg. They weren't from my perspective ever terribly uncomfortable with the 
previous arrangement. The XP and XR communities knew who was supporting 
them. Their concern continues to be cost, schedule and performance. 
• Slower is not necessarily better! It has taken a ridiculously long time for someone 
to decide how to create squadrons and flights within acquisition and other non-
flying wings -- probably because of the forced superposition of a flying wing 
structure on non-operational entities. The Navy never seemed to have a problem 
understanding the differences between sea and shore organizations and billets, 
and inherently fundamental differences in missions and functions. The Army 
seems to do just fine without calling their acquisition and logistics functions 
brigades or battalions. Our next big reorganization will probably being before this 
one is complete. These events regularly occur on 5-7 year cycles. 
• Convert AFMC to almost entirely civilian. I highly respect military individuals 
but the need for military in this command is almost non existent. The military 
billets could be better used in the operational commands. AFMC should probably 
become an agency and run under civilian control to provide goods and services 
for the warfighter, not occupy the warfighter in day to day non military functions. 
• Funding and Strengthening IT 
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• The power structure is now more lopsided than ever. The Wings offer no value 
added to the acquisition & execution of the program. The Wings have turned into 
nothing more than these huge dynasties. 
• Most enjoy their job, but get frustrated by the multiple "taskers" for information. 
Most ask for similar things, but not exactly the same. You get tasked from SAF, 
then the functional, but then get something a little different from the CC, and 
again, more tasks from Wing, Group. Their needs to be one single funnel for 
information. Just because a task has Finance in the title, doesn't mean that it’s a 
Finance task, but that is what happens. If it deals with the program, the Program 
Manager should answer, if it deals with contracting, PK should answer. 
• Get the information out to all and request comments & concerns. I felt that no one 
cared about the workers and that this was something that the disconnected bosses 
forced on us. 
• Too many changes from initial briefed plan to final outcome (and it still isn't 
complete as Wing names have not yet been changed to numbered Wings). 
• Organic Manpower was not provided to stand up the Wings, three of the four 
"new" wing staffs are full of contractor support, increasing the overhead costs for 
the center.... 
o I believe that if you are going to orient based on capabilities, then the 
organizations have to be collocated to provide for an opportunity to cross-
fertilize and learn from each other on a day to day basis. (2) The GSUs, 
even with technology, are greatly disadvantaged by the fact that few 
employees ever see their Product Center Commanders or their staffs on a 
regular basis. (3) Activities, such as source selections and contract review, 
become harder and harder to maintain to do because of the cost of travel 
that is necessary and is not planned into the overall process. (4) Real 
consolidation (i.e., moving bodies to where the work really is) has to 
follow re-organization. 
• Don't attempt to artificially overlay an operation structure onto what had been 
properly organized on a "business organization" model. 
• Use the KISS Principle Follow the REORG Rules or Don't Reorganize! Too 
much Political and Bureaucratic Management layers 
• Try to come up with easier to understand/remember unit identifications. 
• Platforms don't recognize the shift from Platform based integration to Capability 
based integration. Many, if not all, of the Platform PM's do not appreciate our 
involvement in "their" Platform. Their lack of cooperation inhibits our ability to 
substantiate/defend the funding required to integrate this capability into their 
Platform, as result we constantly have our funding cut which adversely affects the 
Platforms. The TDN AFI and the TDN AFPD, which defines MAJCOM roles and 
responsibilities, needs to be signed at the highest levels to mandate cooperation 
ASAP. 
• Keep organizations properly manned, if we are not, it inhibits our ability to 
capitalize of any "new and improved" method. 
• More consideration for integration among systems. 
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• A squadron is defined more by the activities and interaction that happen outside 
of the mission. We need more Cols and Lt Cols that will spend time with the 
troops, in an informal setting. 
• Keep people better informed. 
• With limited resources being separated into Wings / Groups, how about forcing 
the Wing Commanders and Group Commanders to play nice together? It is way to 
often the case that they are empire building and can't play together in the same 
sand box. Get rid of the grey hairs that can't adjust to change and remind these 
over zealous commanders that they work for the US Air Force and not for them 
selves. It is very embarrassing to see and hear how childish these Colonels, SES's 
and GO's have been behaving!! Get with the program...you work as a team and 
get the job done! Then you can go home and build your empire in your private 
life. 
• Yes this goal day thing is silly. The basis of allowing personnel to have a day off 
based on the actions of senior leadership sounds like a broke process. Give your 
people time off...you certainly can't affect their pay. Overall I think the command 
could learn a lot from ACC, AMC and PACAF on how to take care of their troops 
better. Work load compared to manning here is definitely not balanced. Some 
offices work 6 day weeks while others have time to give off. Some worked 
through the holidays while other offices were able to tell people to "go home and 
just stay local". 
• A new commander = reorganization. The only variable is the degree of the 
magnitude of the reorganization. Relearning and training take a significant level 
of resources. 
• The reorganization was supposed to be "resource neutral." However, it has not 
worked out that way and there were new positions established and new 
contractors hired to do the new tasks that were previously done elsewhere (i.e., 
resource management at the Wing level vs. centrally at the Functional area level.) 
• I came in on the tail end of the current reorganization. I heard a lot of "...it was 
better back then because...."; however, overall everyone picked up the new 
organization. You have to be careful to not loose functionality in the 
reorganization. Some crucial cross functional integration activities can get lost in 
the reorganization with everyone thinking that this will be taken up by a different 
office. Ensure that functionality still exists with information cross flow. 
• Realign manpower, which was totally neglected in reorg. 
• Good communication on upcoming changes. 
• Wing/group/squadron initiative is a good idea, but devil is in the details. There is 
now another layer of management (the wing) when it wasn't there before. Staff 
work has increased dramatically. Resources the same--Three reasons people fail 
per Gen Martin--lack of resources (yes--same job, more management, more work, 
people being pulled off programs out of hide to man the new and growing staffs), 
training (no real problems here--you have a bunch of heroes in the workforce who 
will succeed in spite of the every-other-year change the names reorgs for reorg 
sake), and guidance (very poor guidance--who is the boss? Who should I be loyal 
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to--my program, my group, my wing, the PEG, the PEO, SAF/AQ? So, the reorg 
exacerbated our already existing resource problem and muddied the water on 
guidance. Guess what--we will succeed anyway, and I love my job and the AF--
will keep coming to work to field systems to the warfighter in spite of all this 
mess. That is what is important anyway. 
• I think you're on the right track with the reorg...just need bodies to do the work. 
• Cross-reference matrix of old organization name to new organization 
name/number. 
• At least at the lower levels, there is still a huge resistance to adapt to the Wing, 
Group, and Sq structure. Communications and tasking still come in from multiple 
directions and responses do not always get fully coordinated. Empire building is 
still a big problem. Our Group still is trying to figure out how they can bring more 
business in and not on how they can deliver the capabilities they've already been 
tasked to procure better, cheaper and faster. 
 
110 respondents selected “no answer” for this question. 
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Appendix L: Acronyms Used 
 
 
AAC – Air Armament Center 
AE – Acquisition Center of Excellence  
AF – Air Force 
ABW – Air Base Wing  
AFMC – Air Force Materiel Command 
ALC – Air Logistics Center 
ASC – Aeronautical Systems Center 
DO – Operations Directorate 
DoD – Department of Defense 
DR – Requirements Directorate 
EN – Engineering Directorate 
ESC – Electronic Systems Center 
FY – Fiscal Year 
IN – Intelligence  
LG – Logistics and Sustainment Directorate 
MAJCOM – Major Command 
MS – Mission Support Directorate  
PC – Product Center 
PEO – Program Executive Officer 
SES – Senior Executive Service 
SPSS – Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, Version 13.0 
ST – Science and Technology 
TR – Transformation Directorate 
XR – Capabilities Integration Directorate  
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